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EARLY ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CONTEXT:
EXPERIMENTATION WITH THE OFFEROR PROCESS
AT THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION
CARL ToBiAs*
During the 1980s Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has come of
age.' Much experimentation with consensual decisional processes has been
conducted in the context of federal administrative agency proceedings. The
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) has stamped its
imprimatur on the concept of ADR, the Environmental Protection Agency
has negotiated successfully several rulemakings, and a plethora of addi-
tional agencies have implemented, are experimenting with, or are contem-
plating the application of, consensual decisional processes. The efficacy
of ADR remains controversial and debate continues over how best to
implement consensual procedures, while much agency experimentation has
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Barry Boyer, Tom Huff, Bill
Luneburg, Bill Rossbach, Peggy Sanner and Roy Schotland for valuable suggestions, all
who so generously offered opinions on the offeror process, and the Harris Trust for
generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
1. For definitions of ADR, see Leiberman & Henry, Lessons From the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 424 (1986). For definitions of ADR,
and helpful compilations of mechanisms available, in a federal administrative agency context,
see Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) Recommendation 86-3, 51 Fed.
Reg. 25,641, 25,643-45 (1986) (codified at I C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1987)). These mechanisms
are discussed thoroughly in P. Harter, Points on A Continuum: Dispute Resolution Proce-
dures and the Administrative Process (1986), a report prepared by the ACUS and on which
its Recommendation is premised. Cf. Harter, The Role of Courts in Regulatory Negotiation-
A Response to Judge Wald, 11 COLUM. J. ENvr. L. 51, 69 (1986) (and sources cited therein);
Susskind & McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON
REG. 133, 165 (1985) (and sources cited therein) (examples of widespread application of
ADR, especially in administrative context). See generally G. BINoW.m, RESOLVING ENVIRON-
MENTAL DIsPuTEs: A DECADE OF EXPEPRENCE (1985) (survey of ADR in environmental
context). For representative views that capture the controversial nature of ADR, see Edwards,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HAiv. L. REv. 668, 684 (1986);
McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985); Fiss, Out of Eden, 94
YALE L.J. 1669 (1985); Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). Numerous
decisional mechanisms could be used as a paradigm, but regulatory negotiation is employed
in this Article for several reasons. It has been the subject of much successful experimentation,
close evaluation, and careful data collection, while it is typical of, and fungible with,
numerous other decisional processes. For a recent evaluation of four negotiated rulemakings
that have been completed, see Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies:
Evaluation of Recommendations By the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74
GEo. L.J. 1625 (1986). For compilations of other past, ongoing and contemplated negotiated
rulemakings, see id. at 1682-88; Administrative Conference of the United States, 1 Admin.
Conf. News 8 (1987).
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proceeded slowly by trial and error pursuant to certain suggested condi-
tions. These considerations make it important not only to analyze current
exploratory efforts but also to evaluate precursors of mechanisms currently
undergoing experimentation. One of the most significant of these forerun-
ners with which the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) ex-
perimented in the 1970s was the offeror process, an innovative administrative
procedure in which extra-agency entities developed proposed consumer
product safety standards. Now that dispute resolution approaches similar
to the offeror process are being applied widely, it is important to explore
the offeror process to ascertain how experience with it informs present
experimentation.
2
The first part of this paper discusses the origins and development of
the offeror procedure, especially its institution and implementation at the
CPSC. The next section analyzes the quality and effect on decisional
processes of funded citizen participation in the seven offeror proceedings
conducted by that agency. The third segment draws conclusions about the
reimbursed involvement and about the offeror process from the Commis-
sion's experience. The last portion affords suggestions for future experi-
mentation with participant compensation and with successors of the offeror
mechanism.
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFEROR PROCEDURE
A. Origins and Nascent Development
The origins and early development of the offeror process warrant only
cursory treatment. 3 During 1967, Congress created the National Commis-
2. 1 recently analyzed funded public participation in proceedings of the Consumer
Product Safety Commission. See Tobias, Of Great Expectations and Mismatched Compen-
sation: Government Sponsored Public Participation In Proceedings Of The Consumer
Product Safety Commission, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. (1986). "Reimbursement," "compensation"
and "funding" are used synonymously in this Article to mean voluntary payment from
agency resources for expenses incurred by public participants in administrative proceedings.
"Public" and "citizen" are employed interchangeably to mean "nonindustry." The terms
"involvement," "participation" and "activity" are used synonymously to mean input
intended to contribute to resolution of issues in proceedings. "Efficacy" and "effectiveness"
are employed interchangeably to describe the impact public participation has on agency
decisionmaking. When collecting data for the evaluation mentioned above, I also assembled
considerable information on citizen participation in the offeror process. The material gathered
on compensated participation in offeror initiatives was not reported principally because the
funded involvement differs in certain respects from the reimbursed activity examined earlier
and partly because the offeror proceedings were broadly condemned as a failed experiment,
and the procedure was abolished.
3. Others have treated competently these matters. See Schwartz, The Consumer
Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 32 (1982) (evaluation of offeror process, CPSC, and CPSC's legislation and
procedures on which I rely substantially in this article); see also Scalia & Goodman,
Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 899 (1973)
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sion on Product Safety (NCPS), which was to analyze thoroughly consumer
product hazards and determine whether new protections were needed to
reduce harm attributable to consumer products. 4 The National Commission
undertook a comprehensive assessment and published a Final Report in
1970. NCPS concluded that unreasonable product hazards unduly endan-
gered consumers and found that existing measures, such as federal and
state legislation, producer self-regulation and common law tort causes of
action, were inadequate.' Thus, the NCPS suggested that Congress estab-
lish a new governmental entity and endow it with substantial authority,
the most relevant of which would be the power to promulgate industry-
wide consumer product safety standards. Moreover, the statute which the
National Commission recommended that Congress enact included a specific
provision for the offeror process.
6
B. Legislation
In 1972, Congress adopted the suggestion of the NCPS, making the
offeror mechanism a centerpiece of the Consumer Product Safety Act
(CPSA), which created the Consumer Product Safety Commission and
granted it comprehensive authority to regulate consumer products.7 The
offeror process was a novel two-step procedure for CPSC promulgation
of mandatory safety standards. When the agency found that compulsory
controls were necessary to protect the public from risks posed by consumer
products, the CPSC issued a Notice of Proceeding (NOP) inviting extra-
Commission entities to suggest existing requirements or to offer to develop
new ones.8 Offerors might be individual citizens; public interest organi-
zations, such as the National Consumers League (NCL); voluntary stand-
ards writing organizations, such as the American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM); industry trade associations, such as the Outdoor Power
Equipment Institute (OPEI); or manufacturers, distributors or retailers of
(another helpful early assessment of same considerations); Special Issue: The Consumer
Product Safety Commission, 43 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1001 (1975) (same); Perritt, supra note
1, at 1630-36 (origins and development of analogous concept of negotiated rulemaking); cf.
Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority
to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 82 CoLum. L. REv. 906,
907-18 (1982) (origins and development of funded public participation).
4. See Joint Resolution to Establish a National Commission on Product Safety, Pub.
L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466, 470 (1967). See generally Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at
900; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 36 (discussions of National Commission's creation).
5. See National Comm'n on Prod. Safety, Final Report Presented to the President
and Congress 1-3 (1970). See generally Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at 900-01; Schwartz,
supra note 3, at 36-41 (discussions of National Commission's work).
6. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 41-42, 57-58. "But is was not given careful
consideration." Id. at 57 n.176.
7. See Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at 901-16; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 42-
45, 57-58.
8. See Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at 907; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 59.
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the product considered to present risk to the public.9 Interested entities
were afforded thirty days in which to submit proposals,10 and the CPSC
had to choose at least one applicant unless extant safety standards were
deemed sufficient to protect the public." Moreover, the agency could
"agree to contribute to the offeror's cost" in developing proposed re-
quirements.12 Those individuals or groups selected by the CPSC as offerors
had to provide opportunities for involvement of "interested persons (in-
cluding representatives of consumers and consumer organizations)" in
standard development.' 3 The CPSA, however, left to Commission judg-
ment the specifics of nonindustry participation 4 and was silent about
reimbursement for such activity.5 Congress was nearly as cryptic about
the role the legislative branch envisioned for the agency while the proposed
standard was being developed.' 6 Offerors were given 150 days from issu-
ance of the NOP to tender recommendations. ' 7
Upon receipt of an offeror's submission, the CPSC had sixty days to
terminate the initiative or to issue a proposed consumer product safety
standard. 8 If the Commission decided to proceed, the agency published a
proposed safety standard which might include all or none of the offeror's
suggestions.' 9 Issuance of the proposal triggered the second phase of the
offeror process that essentially was to follow the informal rulemaking
requirements imposed under the Administrative Procedure Act. 20
Dissatisfaction with the offeror process, articulated by numerous in-
dividuals and entities that participated in or were familiar with the seven
proceedings which the CPSC conducted, led Congress to amend the
procedure during 1978.21 However, the offeror process was not employed
subsequently, and Congress eliminated it in 1981 while providing for
9. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 59; cf. id. at 58; Scalia & Goodman, supra note
3, at 913-15 (discussion of special provision for offeror that is manufacturer, distributor or
retailer).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(b)(4) (Supp. 11 1972) (repealed 1981).
11. See id. § 2056(c)-(d) (repealed 1981); Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at 907.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 2056(d)(2) (1976) (repealed 1981). See generally Scalia & Goodman,
supra note 3, at 907, 911; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 58 (background discussion of possible
agency contribution to offeror's cost).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 2056(d)(3)(B) (1976) (repealed 1981).
14. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 60. See generally Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at
911-13 (background discussion of CPSA's leaving to CPSC judgment specifics of public
participation).
15. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 60. See generally infra note 28 and accompanying
text (discussion of CPSA's silence regarding reimbursement for public participation).
16. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 60.
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(b) (Supp. 11 1972) (repealed 1981).
18. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 60; Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at 916.
19. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 60; Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3, at 908.
20. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 60.
21. See Tobias, supra note 2, at n.79 (discussion of dissatisfaction with the offeror








From 1974 until 1977, the CPSC paid entities that functioned as
offerors and individual members of the public who assisted the offerors
in developing proposed consumer product safety standards governing haz-
ards associated with seven consumer products. 2 The offerors were two
voluntary standards writing organizations, two consumer groups and three
industry-oriented entities.2 The individual citizens who aided the offerors
primarily were representatives of regulated interests, 2s although a number
of the persons, including technical consumers and "lay" consumers or
product users, were not associated with industry. 26 The seven products
were architectural glass, power lawn mowers, matchbooks, swimming pool
slides, television receivers (TVR), miniature Christmas tree lights (MCTL)
and public playground equipment. The decision whether to pay individuals
more than out-of-pocket costs was controversial. 27 Thus, additional ex-
penses, such as lost wages, were covered in one proceeding, while negative
resolution of the issue led the CPSC to reject an application submitted by
a consumer organization which wished to serve as the offeror in a second
22. See Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1203, 95 Stat. 703, 704-13 (1981), codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 2056(a) (Supp. V 1981) (1981 abolition legislation); 15 U.S.C. § 2054(a)(4) (Supp. V 1981
(funding provision); see also Tobias, supra note 2, at notes 91-92 and accompanying text
(fiscal constraints imposed by decreased CPSC budget well may explain failure to invoke
specific funding authority). See generally Klayman, Standard Setting Under the Consumer
Product Safety Amendments of 1981-A Shift in Regulatory Philosophy, 51 GEO. WASH.
L. Rnv. 96, 110 (1982) (analysis of 1981 amendment to CPSA). The only other federal
legislation which provides for an offeror-like process is the Medical Device Amendments of
1976. See 21 U.S.C. § 360d(c)(1) (1976). For an analysis of the legislative provision that
compares it to CPSC's offeror process and which indicates that the Food and Drug
Administration has been reluctant to apply the offeror-like mechanism, see Schwartz,
Performance Standards Under the Medical Device Amendments: A Flawed Process in Need
of Reform, 39 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 318 (1984).
23. The public playground equipment proceeding, which CPSC designated a "quasi-
offeror" proceeding, is considered an offeror proceeding in this Article. The chainsaw
proceeding which might be considered a "quasi-offeror" proceeding is not so treated here.
See generally Tobias, supra note 2, at § II.B.7. (analysis of chainsaw proceeding).
24. The offerors were respectively ASTM and Underwriters Laboratory (UL), NCL
and Consumers Union (CU), and the Consumer Safety Glazing Committee (CSGC), the
National Swimming Pool Institute (NSPI) now re-named the National Spa and Pool Institute
and the National Recreation and Parks Association (NRPA).
25. The percentage of citizen representatives varied but usually comprised at least one-
third and often as much as two-thirds of the groups which developed the proposed standards.
26. The technical consumers included engineers and physicians. The "lay" consumers
included consumer advocates and homemakers.
27. See Note, Inside the Proposed Standard for Architectural Glass: An Outward Look
at Consumer Participation in the CPSA's Offeror Process, 43 GEo. WASH. L. Rsv. 1078,
1175-96 (1975).
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initiative. 21 Widespread criticism of the offeror process prompted Congress
to amend the mechanism in 1978; however, the agency did not employ
the procedure thereafter, and it was abolished three years later.29
D. Prior Studies
There are several analyses of the offeror process, but none evaluates
closely the efficacy or quality of funded participation or operation of the
mechanism itself in all of the CPSC's proceedings. During 1974 and 1975,
a law student conducted a general examination of the architectural glazing
initiative. 0 The next year, the Commission's Office of Program Planning
and Evaluation (OPPE) analyzed the efforts of the agency and of offer-
ors-not of individual citizens-and certain implications of the procedure,
in the first four matters.3 A 1977 study undertaken by the Comptroller
General 2 and a 1978 Congressional report focused almost exclusively on
the CPSC's institution and management of the offeror process and the
difficulties that the agency encountered in its implementation.3 There is
much Congressional testimony about the procedure and the seven pro-
ceedings.3 4 During 1981, a consultant for the Administrative Conference
of the United States (ACUS) completed a thoroughgoing evaluation of the
work of the CPSC and the offeror as well as the process in the lawn
mower initiative while summarily assessing these considerations in several
other proceedings and the efforts of individuals in the lawn mower matter.
3
1
In sum, several hundred individuals and organizations helped develop
proposed consumer product safety standards in seven offeror initiatives
of the Consumer Product Safety Commission. But neither the offeror
28. See 43 Fed. Reg. 19, 136 (1978) (discussion of the first proceeding which was
MCTL); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 66-68 (same); see also Note, supra note 27, at 1175-96
(discussion of the second proceeding which was architectural glass). For full discussion of
how individuals and entities involved in proposed standard development, indicating most
pertinently that no public money was paid to employees of product manufacturers, see
infra, note 63.
29. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
30. See Note, supra note 27.
31. See OFFICE OF PROGRAM PLANING AND EVALUATION, CPSC, EVALUATiON OF
OFFEROR PROCESS (Nov. 5, 1976) [hereinafter OPPE REPORT].
32. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION
NEEDS TO ISSUE SAFETY STANDARDS FASTER (Dec. 12, 1977) [hereinafter GAO STUDY].
33. See H.R. REP. No. 1164, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 9434, 9452 [hereinafter HOUSE OFMROR REPORT].
34. See, e.g., CPSC Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigation of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 House Oversight Hearings].
35. See Schwartz, supra note 3. Cf. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards
in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Health and Safety, 56 TEx.
L. REv. 1329, 1399-1416 (1978) (ACUS consultant's evaluation of CPSC and offeror work
in several proceedings in context of broader study); Meeting on Consumer Participation in
Section 7 Proceedings, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 6, 1975) [hereinafter Consumer Participation
Meeting] (participants' observations on consumer involvement in first offeror proceedings).
[Vol. 44:409
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mechanism nor much of this involvement has been analyzed carefully.
Thus, it is important to evaluate rigorously the offeror process as well as
contributions of citizens and offerors.
II. ASSESSMENT OF OFFEROR PROCEEDINGS AT THE CONSUMER PRODUCT
SAFETY COMMISSION
A. Methodology
It is difficult to analyze the CPSC's offeror initiatives. But the prob-
lems that I confronted in conducting the evaluation which follows and
their resolution need be recounted only briefly here, principally because
the methodology applied is similar in most significant respects to that I
have employed before. 6
Several reasons underlie the decision to assess the Commission's of-
feror process. 7 Most importantly, the nature of offeror and citizen in-
volvement in the development of proposed consumer product safety
standards and the character of the offeror procedure meant public partic-
ipation in the process and the device itself could be contrasted meaningfully
with citizen activity in other proceedings3" and with more recently created
decisional mechanisms, thus affording instructive insights for future ex-
perimentation. 9 The agency's experience with the offeror procedure pro-
vided numerous additional benefits. For example, there were few enough
initiatives to permit detailed examination, but a sufficient number to allow
effective comparison. However, analysis of experimentation at the CPSC
did involve disadvantages and trade-offs.
40
The contributions of individuals and offerors, primarily to develop-
ment of proposed standards but also to agency decisionmaking, will be
considered input and evaluated in terms of efficacy and quality.41 "Effi-
cacy," which is employed synonymously with effectiveness and impact,
asks whether the contributions of citizens and offerors had a salutary
effect on decisional processes-both proposed standard development and
subsequent Commission consideration. 42 "Quality," which is less stringent
36. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § II.A. One important difference is that I am analyzing
the offeror process itself.
37. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § II.A.l. (discussion of advantages afforded by single
agency analysis, especially at CPSC).
38. See id. at § I.A.4, § B.2. (discussion of other funded citizen activity).
39. See supra note 2; infra, §§ III., IV.
40. For example, most of the proceedings commenced more than a decade ago.
41. It is important to remember that there were two decisional processes: proposed
standard development for which offerors had ultimate responsibility and CPSC consideration
of the results of that effort over which the agency had authority.
42. Foi example, did input force decisionmakers to treat more constructively questions
at issue. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § II.A.2.a. (more discussion of this term and other
definitional approaches and difficulties); id. at § II.A.2.b. (discussion of difficulties entailed
in measuring efficacy). These are exacerbated by the factors mentioned, supra note 41.
1987]
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and more subjective than efficacy, is nearly as important and as difficult
to define. Quality considers how good the input was, implicating the
validity of the views advanced and how they were advocated.
43
In consulting sources of data on the input of individuals and offerors
in the offeror process and on the offeror procedure itself, I attempted to
consider, assemble and report as much information as practicable and,
when limitations were encountered, to be as representative as possible.
The potential sources were the studies mentioned above, twenty Congres-
sional hearings, the CPSC "files" and approximately one thousand persons
familiar with the offeror process. 44 I read all of the studies and hearings
and relevant material listed in the index to each file.45 Every pertinent
reference to effectiveness or quality or to the offeror process that I found
in these sources, notwithstanding reliability, is reported below. 4 Because
so many people were familiar with the offeror proceedings, but most of
the persons also had an interest in the initiatives and in the perceived
efficacy and quality of citizen and offeror input, I sought the perspectives
of a substantial, roughly equivalent number of people drawn from the
three principal classifications of informed protagonists-CPSC, commer-
cial and nonregulated interests. 47 The views were solicited by telephone,
and those interviewed were asked the nature of their interest and their
opinions of efficacy and quality and of the offeror procedure. 4 The data
gleaned, regardless of dependability, are paraphrased or reported verbatim
below.
I relied upon the material assembled to reach conclusions regarding
the effectiveness and the quality of individual and offeror input.49 For
each of the offeror initiatives, I reviewed all of the information collected.
50
First, I tried to formulate preliminary judgments by considering citizen
43. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § II.A.2.a. (more discussion of this term).
44. See supra notes 30-33, 35 and accompanying text (relating to studies); supra note
34 and accompanying text (relating to hearings). The files that contain most of the data
collected by CPSC are available at its Office of the Secretary (OS), 5401 Westbard, Bethesda,
MD. See generally Tobias, supra note 2, at § II.A.2.c. (relating to persons familiar with
the process).
45. Whole files were not read because some were 20,000 pages and the endeavor did
not seem cost-beneficial.
46. See infra, § II.B. of this Article. This provides important advantages, such as
transmission of raw data, free of value choices. See Tobias, supra note 2, at n.127 (listing
other advantages).
47. The crucial difficulty was how to maximize accuracy in terms of familiarity and
potential prejudice. The approach attempts to guard against bias by offering some statistical
validity and opportunities to contrast views articulated. See generally Tobias, supra note 2,
at n.132; id. at n.131 (discussion of the protagonists).
48. See id. at notes 133-36 and accompanying text (for more discussion of telephone
interviewing).
49. See infra, § III.A. of this Article; Tobias, supra note 2, at n.137-47 and accom-
panying text (more discussion of difficulties entailed in reaching such conclusions).




and offeror contributions and that material which offered no explicit
opinion regarding the impact or quality of the input.5 ' I then reviewed
every opinion of the efficacy and quality of input, attempting to accord
the opinion weight, premised on accuracy in terms of sources' objectivity
and knowledge, using a number of factors.5 2 The values initially assigned
were modified as indicated in reaching final determinations.
5 3
Moreover, I formulated conclusions about the offeror process. I re-
considered views expressed about that procedure by the sources mentioned
above to ascertain whether the process itself had important implications
for the perceived efficacy and quality of offeror and citizen involvement
in it.14 These perspectives also were consulted in assessing the effectiveness
of the process as a technique for developing standards, for making
decisions and for resolving disputes, especially in contrast with other intra-
and extra-agency mechanisms for doing so, as well as in determining if
lessons gleaned from the offeror experience might inform experimentation
with more recently created approaches.
5
The methodological complications examined above are the most sig-
nificant and problematic. Nonetheless, numerous additional difficulties, a
number of which already were alluded to, attend attempts at "rigorous"
assessment.5 6 For instance, the question of priorities implicates matters
such as the breadth and depth of evaluation. I tried to examine as
stringently as possible as much offeror and citizen input throughout as
much of the entire process as was feasible.5 7 Correspondingly, certain
aspects of the analysis are limited by practical factors. One important
factor is when to assess.5 8 Now that Congress has abolished the offeror
process and some time has passed since most proceedings were conducted,
it might not seem propitious to evaluate them. Ironically, passage of time,
which yields a number of advantages-such as increased detachment-and
other considerations, actually mean that today is quite appropriate. Indeed,
revitalization of the offeror process, in the form of such widely heralded
mechanisms as regulatory negotiation, makes the present auspicious, es-
pecially given the need for analysis that could facilitate improvement of
51. This was never conclusive partly because there was so much input.
52. These included theoretical, intangible and more pragmatic factors. See Tobias,
supra note 2, at n.141-43 and accompanying text.
53. Here I used the concepts of balance and consensus, more qualitative, subjective
factors and gestalt judgments. See id. at n.144-47 and accompanying text.
54. See infra, § III.A.2. of this Article.
55. See infra, §§ III.A.2.-3.; III.B.; IV. of this Article.
56. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § II.A.3. (listing additional complications); id. at §
IV. (discussion of certain considerations entailed in rigorous analysis).
57. 1 attempted to accord each of the seven proceedings roughly equal treatment. But
I did make certain choices guided by factors such as relative significance of funded input
to the proceeding in which it occurred.
58. See Tobias, supra note 2, at notes 149-52 and accompanying text (more discussion
of the timing issue).
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the newer devices currently undergoing widespread experimentation. 9 Ad-
ditional problems impede rigorous assessment, particularly the type of
evaluation that I have recommended elsewhere for persons undertaking
studies in the future. 60 However, all analyses have their limits, while the
determination to assess the offeror process is reasonable, especially in light
of ongoing and future work with similar techniques and their apparent
promise.6'
B. Proceeding-Specific Assessment
For all of the offeror proceedings, which are considered chronologi-
cally, I include descriptive evaluations of the initiatives and verbatim or
paraphrased opinions, 62 and my assessments, of the efficacy and quality
of government sponsored public involvement. The contributions of indi-
vidual citizens and of offerors, 61 principally to proposed standard devel-
opment but secondarily to Commission decisionmaking, will be treated as
input and analyzed in terms of effectiveness and quality.
1. Architectural Glazing
In August, 1974, the CPSC selected the Consumer Safety Glazing
Committee (CSGC) as the offeror to develop requirements for treating
hazards associated with architectural glass." The Committee, a "group of
industry, labor and general interest groups" formed to lobby for state
model safety glazing legislation, had petitioned the CPSC to adopt a
mandatory standard in June, 1973.65 But the CSGC was chosen only after
the organization revised its original application and agency negotiations
59. See supra, notes 1-2.
60. See Tobias, supra note 2, at n.156 (sources cited define the problems); id. at §
IV. (defining the prescriptions).
61. It also is realistic and worthwhile to evaluate funded involvement in the process
and to collect systematically data on compensated activity, especially for purposes of
comparison with other such activity and related mechanisms. See generally id. at notes 158-
60 and accompanying text.
62. To preserve the confidentiality of CPSC officials, compensated entities, and people
I interviewed, most persons whose opinions are reported are identified by numbers for each
initiative. This journal's editors are relying upon me to verify the opinions. Most interviews
were held in 1983 and 1984. Inquiries as to sources should be directed to me.
63. Most citizens were not paid directly by the agency but by offerors from CPSC
lump sum payments to them or from offerors' resources. I believe that no employees of
product manufacturers were paid any public money. The input of individuals, however
funded out of public money, is evaluated below. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 64 n.223
(amounts CPSC paid offerors).
64. See 41 Fed. Reg. 6178, 6178 (1976); cf. id. at 6178-79; OPPE RPPoILT, supra note
31, at D-1 to D-9 (discussions of proceeding); Note, supra note 27 (same, focusing on
consumer participation).
65. 41 Fed. Reg. 6178, 6178 (1976). Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 56 n.168; Note,
supra note 27, at 1173-76 (discussion of CSGC and members' interests in standard devel-
opment and CSGS's prior efforts in area).
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with another entity, the National Consumers League, reached an impasse
over the issue of financing non-commercial involvement in proposed stand-
ard development. 6 Funded citizens comprised approximately one-third of
the people who worked with the CSGC.67 The offeror was granted one
time extension 6s and submitted its recommendations to the CPSC during
January, 1975.69 Commission staff modified considerably the suggestions
proferred by the CSGC, 70 and the agency published a proposed rule in
February, 1976. 71 Eleven months later, the CPSC issued a final regulation
said to resemble, but lack the clarity of, a voluntary standard which the
Commission already had found deficient. 72 There is widespread agreement
that this was one of the least successful offeror initiatives; 73 the rule did
not completely withstand judicial scrutiny74 and has been revised contin-
ually.7
5
Many have criticized the efforts of the CSGC. The Chairman of the
National Commission on Product Safety accused the offeror of tendering
a "weaker standard than that proposed by the voluntary sector [, afford-
ing] less protection to the consumer than he could have had at no cost."
1 76
66. See Note, supra note 27, at 1175-96 (discussion of CSOC's selection); see also
Hearings on Regulatory Reform Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. IV,
342-64 (1976) [hereinafter Regulatory Reform Hearings] (Commissioners' Opinions on ne-
gotiations with National Consumers League).
67. See Note, supra note 27, at 1196-1202 (discussion of the consumers, their selection,
backgrounds and participation).
68. See 40 Fed. Reg. 10, 227 (1975). See generally Note, supra note 27, at 1204-05
(discussion of time extension).
69. See Current Report, 3 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 100, 100 (Jan. 31, 1975).
70. See 42 Fed. Reg. 6178, 6178-87 (1976); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 88 n.419 and
accompanying text.
71. See 41 Fed. Reg. 6178, 6181-87 (1976); cf. id. at 6178-87 (discussion of some
CPSC modifications in CSGC's recommendations).
72. See 42 Fed. Reg. 1428, 1441 (1977), codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 1201.1-1201.7 (1983)
(final rule); cf. Hearings on Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appro-
priations for 1980 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Indep. Agencies of the Senate Appro-
priations Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 82 (1979) [hereafter 1980 Senate Appropriations
Hearings] (statement of Senator Proxmire); Telephone interviews (TIs) with industry repre-
sentatives 1, 2 (final rule's unclear nature).
73. See, e.g., 1980 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 72, at 82-84 (statement
of Senator Proxmire); 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 285 (statement of
Comm'r Pittle); Pittle, The Restricted Regulator, 12 TRmL 18, 27 (May 1976); TIs, supra
note 72.
74. See ASG Indus., Inc. v. CPSC, 593 F.2d 1323, 1337 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 864 (1979).
75. See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 57,383, 57,383 (1980); 43 Fed. Reg. 57,244, 57,594 (1978).
See generally CPSC Reauthorization: Hearings on H.R. 2271 and H.R. 2201 Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 345-46 (1981) [hereinafter H.R. 2271 Hearings] (statement of Acting
Chairman Statler). Indeed, these revisions have continued until quite recently. See, e.g., 49
Fed. Reg. 15,256, 15,256 (1984); 48 Fed. Reg. 20,762, 20,762 (1983).
76. Comment from Arnold Elkind to CPSC, reprinted in Current Report, 3 Prod.
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Employees of the CPSC with line responsibility for reviewing the CSGC's
submission expressed concern that it was not as technically accurate as
feasible or as responsible as possible to requirements in the agency's
NOP. 77 The authors of the OPPE Report and numerous additional per-
sonnel at the CPSC agreed with one Commissioner that the offeror's
suggestions were "nothing more than'warmed over' versions of voluntary
standards previously determined to be inadequate by the Commission,"
so that agency staff had to revise substantially the recommendations.
7
1
Moreover, a CPSC medical officer said that the submission provided by
the CSGC lacked scientific support and that the offeror never correlated
the "human factors" in glass injuries, 79 while the agency's Project Monitor
asserted that many CSGC members desired regulation for commercial
reasons and that the offeror "pulled the wool over the eyes of" the
reimbursed individuals. 0
In fairness to the CSGC, although the staff of the CPSC criticized
strongly, and altered significantly the CSGC's proposal, the offeror's
suggestion differed minimally from the agency's final rule.8 1 Perhaps most
telling was the Commissioners' decision to discontinue consideration of
the risks presented by windows, 2 even though a principal criticism of the
CSGC was the offeror's failure to treat these dangers. 3 Moreover, much
responsibility for perceived deficiencies in CSGC's performance can be
assigned to the CPSC. Two Commissioners admitted that the instructions
initially provided the Committee might have been unclear.14 The CPSC
broadly defined the hazards to be addressed, and there were no readily
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 57, 57 (Jan. 17, 1975) and in Note, supra note 27, at 1204
n.180.
77. See OPPE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 6-11, D-8; GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at
24; Note, supra note 27, at 1204-05 n.182-83; accord Hearings on S.644 and S.1000 Before
the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
92 (1975) [hereinafter S.644 Hearings] (statement of David Swankin).
78. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-7; TIs with CPSC employees 1-3; see also
Pittle, supra note 73, at 17,18 (relating to Commissioner's views); Implementation of the
CPSA: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transp., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (Apr. 1977) [hereinafter Apr. 1977 Senate
Oversight Hearings] (same); Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 66, at 34 (statements
of Comm'r Pittle).
79. An important "human factor" was failure to see a glass door. TI with CPSC
employee 1, supra note 78. Cf. OPPE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 6-11 (CSGC assertion that
relationship between certain hazards and human-glass impacts was developed by offeror,
but CPSC evaluators' assertion that relationship based on insufficient data and deficient
engineering analysis).
80. TI with CPSC employee 2, supra note 78.
81. See 42 Fed. Reg. 1428, 1428 (1977); TI with industry representative 1, supra note
72; TI with CPSC employee 2, supra note 78.
82. See GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at 24; 41 Fed. Reg. 6178, 6178 (1976); OPPE
REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-7.
83. See supra notes 70-71.




available remedies for some of the risks presented.85 Indeed, the offeror
claimed that a reasonable standard could have been promulgated three
years earlier had the CPSC restricted standard development to the issues
identified in the petition submitted originally by the CSGC. 6 Insufficient
injury data existed which meant that the offeror had to spend resources
developing and assembling information. 7 The agency afforded little guid-
ance, assuming a "hands-off" approach throughout the proposed standard
development process,8 but severely criticized the end product tendered by
the CSGC when the CPSC may have lacked the requisite expertise to
assess it. s9 Of course, much of the difficulty experienced may be attrib-
utable to the fact that the architectural glazing proceeding was the first
initiative in which the agency was experimenting with an entirely new
administrative procedure.
Moreover, some assessments of CSGC were positive. Several CPSC
employees were impressed more favorably by the offeror. One staff mem-
ber thought that the CSGC "assembled a number of fairly good ideas,
worked well with building code groups," and developed a high quality
standard.90 Another agency official believed that the offeror's prior ex-
perience with state legislatures enabled it to run a "pretty smooth opera-
tion" but imposed certain constraints, 91 while a third staffer said that
CSGC's "work was generally okay."' 92 Finally, manufacturing represen-
85. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 65 n.231 and accompanying text; Hearings on Dep't
of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1978 Before the Subcomm.
on HUD-Indep. Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, 1707 (1977) [hereinafter 1978 Senate Appropriations Hearings]; GAO STUDY, supra
note 32, at 24-25; OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-7.
86. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-7.
87. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 65 n.233; GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at 32; OPPE
REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-13.
88. TI with industry representative 3; TI with CPSC employee 4; Schwartz, supra note
3, at 64 n.228; Apr. 1977 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 78, at 125, 127 (statements
of Comm'rs Kushner and Pittle).
89. TIs with industry representative 2, supra note 72; TI with industry representative
3, supra note 88. The first person interviewed added that the need "to educate CPSC
personnel and public participants" meant standard development consumed "twice as much
time as it would have without them" and that the "standard which CPSC came up with
was awful [principally] because it did not listen to industry." Id.; cf. TI with industry
representative 5 (much initial staff turnover, much unsubstantiated CPSC criticism of CSGC's
work, and "Commissioners need to put fingerprints" on standard created delay). Other
industry representatives echoed these, and voiced additional criticisms, of CPSC's perform-
ance; accord OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4-5, 6-11 to 6-13; Note, supra note 27, at
1199-1200.
90. TI with CPSC employee 5.
91. TI with CPSC employee 6. The official added that the prior experience enabled
CSGC's members to ascertain precisely the impact of specific requirement's imposition and
meant accommodations reached earlier affected standard development; that "there was a
lot of floundering at the beginning;" and that "marketing people and attorneys" who
represented CSGC members were "not in touch with fairly common research data and
techniques." Id.
92. TI with CPSC employee 4, supra note 88.
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tatives have been comparatively positive. One industry employee observed
that the CSGC "did the best job that it could given its working relationship
with the Commission," 93 and a second representative of producers stated
that the "offeror process yielded reasonable results and was fair and well
run [, affording] the public ample opportunity to participate.
'94
Compensated individuals' input is difficult to analyze, but their con-
tributions were variable. Because citizens "did not act in concert," an
extra-agency evaluator had problems assessing their "impact on the final
result." ' 95 The Project Monitor for the CPSC remarked that "consumer
participation was valuable" 96 and that "technical experts actually exerted
considerable influence at meetings" 97 but that citizens were "probably
disadvantaged by lack of organization" and that a "stronger standard
might have resulted had the consumer interest been articulated by skilled
consumer advocates." 98 The monitor also found that the CSGC may have
deceived technical and lay individuals; 99 technical people "did not have
glass expertise" and lay consumers were not helpful because they "lacked
the technical know-how to cut through manufacturers' representations."' 100
Another CPSC officer believed that citizens "asked reasonable questions,
were quite perceptive and caught on quickly," although members of the
public were unfamiliar with the technology. 10 1 But a third Commission
employee thought that the consumer involvement in the architectural
glazing proceeding was not a "terribly good example of public participa-
tion."
102
Numerous industry-oriented observers were critical. The first project
manager for the CSGC considered citizens a "hindrance," facetiously
93. TI with industry representative 3, supra note 88. CPSC failed to "participate as
much as it should have in the overall process" and to provide sufficient data while remaining
too "aloof." Id.
94. TI with industry representative 5, supra note 89. The representative added "three
people in a room could have drafted as fair a standard in a day and a half" but the person
thought that the process was necessary for insuring public confidence and industry compliance
while suggesting that existing standards should "serve as a model for CPSC." Id.
95. Note, supra note 27, at 1199 n.161 and accompanying text. "If the consumers had
organized ... their influence might have been greater." Id. at 1200 n.168. See id. at 1196-
1202 (additional observations).
96. Note, supra note 27, at 1205 n.184.
97. Id. at 1200 n.167.
98. See id. at text accompanying note 167 (appearance of first observation); id. at
1205 n.184 (appearance of second observation). The observer also "characterized the con-
sumer participants as primarily another set of people with brains, and not necessarily
representative of a specific point of view" and "described the consumers' responsibilities
as injecting a nontechnical viewpoint into the development of the safety glazing standard
and ensuring the openness, and, therefore, the credibility of the proceedings." Id. at 1200
n.167.
99. TI, with CPSC employee 2, supra note 78.
100. Id.
101. TI with CPSC employee 6, supra note 91.
102. TI with CPSC employee 5, supra note 90.
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remarking that they were so effective that he resigned. 03 A second person
associated with manufacturers found that consumer involvement essentially
was "detrimental to arriving at a good, workable standard expeditiously,"
because of the time devoted necessarily to educating lay people.'04 A lawyer
who challenged the glass rule in court claimed that individuals lacked the
"technical background to be any real help in developing a standard that
was very technical."' 05 A fourth observer said that a "number of con-
sumers clearly never understood what was going on" but "others took
the time to investigate, became very knowledgeable and did an excellent
job once they got over the original education hurdle. 10 6 Additional
manufacturing representatives were more positive. Counsel for the CSGC
stated that citizens "were dedicated, contributed substantially and became
very conversant with the product and articulate about modes of injury."' 0 7
One industry employee commented that individuals brought to discussions
"much practical insight" that producers even lacked and "questioned
more data than anyone else,"'' 0 while a second manufacturing represent-
ative found "really refreshing the different viewpoint and interplay"
provided by the public. 09 An evaluator not aligned with commercial
interests asserted that "industry representatives generally were impressed
with the consumers, noting that they often helped resolve conflicts between
industry members."" 0 Nonetheless, few persons associated with producers
whom I interviewed mentioned the second factor.
In response to a questionnaire distributed by the assessor mentioned
immediately above, most funded individuals said that citizens "represented
a unique viewpoint," frequently helping to settle manufacturer infight-
ing."' "Each person felt that he or she had influenced significantly the
course of the development proceeding."" 2 However, a number of these
103. TI with industry representative 1, supra note 72.
104. TI with industry representative 2, supra note 72. The representative added that the
"administrative committee spent most of its time educating the lay people [who were five
years behind the industry] so that they would make the right decisions," and that standard
development "took twice as long" because of public participation. Id.
105. TI with industry representative 4.
106. TI with industry representative 5, supra note 89. The representative added that
"none of the consumers knew anything initially about the problem or the process," that
much time was consumed "bringing them up to speed," and that citizens "were at a
disadvantage all along" with industry but "did an excellent job for the limited experience
and information they had at the time." Id.
107. TI with industry representative 6. The representative added that citizens were
"pretty sophisticated and not dependent on manufacturers, did their homework," attempted
to learn as much as possible about the glass industry and attended all meetings. Id.
108. TI with industry representative 3, supra note 88. The representative added that the
consumers' "realism" pleasantly surprised him and others, and that "public participation
was absolutely essential" and should be integral to future, similar endeavors. Id.
109. TI with industry representative 7.
110. Note, supra note 27, at 1200.
111. Id. at 1202.
112. Id.
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people were much less "satisfied with their performance and influence"
than participants in the subsequent proceeding involving matchbooks where
citizens were more organized. "3 Moreover, some thought that "consumers
had not greatly influenced the final standard" but these observers offered
no explanation for this view. 14 Reimbursed parties also provided their
impressions in an August, 1975 meeting convened by the Commissioners
to evaluate the effectiveness of citizen participation in the initial four
offeror proceedings and the efficacy of the process itself. Many funded
citizens believed that individuals were disadvantaged vis-a-vis manufactur-
ers and, thus, had to rely on them for technical expertise and data." ' But
lay participants were less troubled about this than technically proficient
citizens." 6 One such person, an architect who was familiar with glass
production, needed 90 days to understand the vocabulary and found that
most consumers lacked the "technical skills to even argue some" questions
until the very end of -the process, citing as an example data that were
available to industry at the onset which individuals acquired in the fifth
month after wasting sixty days arguing over issues which the data clearly
resolved. ' " 7 A second technical person observed that he "was hunting
for information, working and pushing and prying here and there in the
industry to get what information" he could during the project's early
phase."" Several others thought that citizens had little impact," 9 while
nearly everyone reiterated criticisms relating to the CPSC 20 and the dearth
of time provided for completion of the work.' 2'
2. Power Lawn Mowers
In September, 1974, the CPSC chose Consumers Union (CU), a
nonprofit "consumer product evaluation and consumer advocacy organi-
zation," to devise requirements for risks presented by power lawn mow-
ers.' 2 CU was selected, after agreeing to certain agency suggestions regarding
public participation.' 23 The Commission chose the group over the Outdoor
Power Equipment Institute (OPEI), a trade association which had peti-
113. Id. at 1209 n.199 and accompanying text.
114. Id. at 1202.
115. See Consumer Participation Meeting, supra note 35.
116. See, e.g., id. at 25,26. Perhaps lay participants had less appreciation of the
problems.
117. See id. at 51.
118. See id. at 99.
119. See, e.g., id. at 97, 131.
120. See, e.g., id. at 98, 173.
121. See, e.g., id. at 51-52, 145.
122. See 39 Fed. Reg. 37,803, 37,803 (1974); OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-29;
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 79; cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 77-95; OPPE REPORT, supra
at D-28-39 (discussions of proceeding).
123. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 79-80 (discussion of CU's modifications, at CPSC
behest, in the consumer participation provisions of its offer); OPPE REPORT, supra note
31, at D-29-30 (same); Note, supra note 27, at 1207-08 (same).
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tioned CPSC to commence the proceeding in August, 1973.124 CU ap-
pointed twenty-four manufacturing and twenty-one consumer representatives
to eight subcommittees. 2 Nonetheless, there was much disparity between
industry and citizen involvement, a discrepancy that was exacerbated over
time as requirements to be imposed on manufacturers appeared to be
crystallizing and more producers came to appreciate their potential import
and as a decreasing number of individuals could afford to participate.
126
Over twenty meetings were held in the initial two months of what
became a very complex project, 127 and CU wrote four drafts before
tendering its suggestions to the CPSC in July, 1975.128 The agency reviewed
and revised the recommendations over a twenty-two month period, inten-
sively analyzing them, 129 developing different or novel requirements, and
assessing input of diverse entities. 30 In May, 1977, CPSC issued a com-
prehensive proposed standard that deleted some suggestions made by CU
and modified many other offeror recommendations.' 31 The agency docu-
ment received 117 comments 3 2 and was criticized severely by interests as
disparate as the OPEI, which asserted that the proposal ratified the "least
desirable aspects" of CU's submission while adopting-without "support
or guidance-new and untried requirements '1 33 and CU, which found its
124. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 56 n.168 and accompanying text (discussion of the
proceeding's background and OPEI's commencement of it); OPPE REPORT, supra note 31,
at D-28-29 (same); 39 Fed. Reg. 37,803, 37,803 (1974) (same); cf. Schwartz, supra at 78-80
(discussion of controversial selection process); OPPE REPORT, supra at D-29-30 (same);
Note, supra note 27, at 1208 n.192 (same).
125. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-31; id. at D-30 to 32 (discussion of the
structure, function, and workings of these subcommittees and initiation of standard devel-
opment); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 80-82 (same).
126. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 82; OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-31; cf.
infra note 173 and accompanying text ("95 percent of the opinions expressed at committee
meetings were controlled or dominated by industry people").
127. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 81.
128. See id. at 81-2; Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1413 n.280; cf. Schwartz, supra, note
3, at 81-82 (discussion of drafts' formulation); id. at 83-85 (concise summary of CU's
proposal).
129. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 85-87.
130. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 353 (statement of Professor
Hamilton) (relating to developing standards); OPEI Position Paper on CPSC Proposed
Mandatory Safety Standard for Power Lawn Mowers (Staff Draft #4 Mar. 3, 1977), reprinted
in id. [hereinafter OPEI Position Paper] (same); cf. Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1413 n.280;
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 87-88 (discussions of position paper). CPSC's "initial in-depth
review of the offeror's proposal and the subsequent development of numerous new or
different requirements [consumed] more time than expected, due to the number, complexity,
and controversial nature of the standard's requirements." Schwartz, supra at 88. See id. at
86, 88 (relating to assessing input); cf. id. at 85-89 (discussion of evaluation phase).
131. See 42 Fed. Reg. 23,052, 23,052-72 (1977); cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 87-88
(concise summary of proposed regulation and comparison of it with CU's suggestions).
132. See 42 Fed. Reg. 34,892 (1977); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 89 n.425 and accom-
panying text.
133. See OPEI Position Paper, supra note 130, at 3.
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work so altered that it sought compensation to comment.1 4 A Commission
hearing on the proposal was held in June, 1977, and three people involved
in the proposed standard development stage were funded to speak. 35
During review of public comment, the CPSC staff found that the input
raised 700 issues, recognized that the endeavor "had become unmanage-
able," and recommended that its scope be circumscribed sharply. 36 The
Commissioners agreed with the staff suggestion, 37 solicited written input
on narrower requirements, 38 and conducted a December, 1978, hearing
which one citizen was paid to attend. 39 the CPSC held many open meetings
on its revised standard during the next two months 40 and promulgated a
final rule in February, 1979, that differed significantly from its proposal
and included few of CU's original ideas.' 4' Although the Commission
regulation survived judicial challenge, 42 Congress postponed its effective
date and instructed the CPSC to implement a suggestion unsuccessfully
championed by industry throughout the lawn mower initiative."43
This was the longest, most difficult, offeror proceeding as well as the
one in which the CPSC attempted to regulate the most complex product.
[I]ntroduction of a novel foot probe' allegedly had 'neither the endorsement of
CU nor . . . any industry verified grounding in population statistics or modes of
operator behavior [while a] new thrown objects test [allegedly departed] in material
ways from the recommendations of the Commission's own contractor. .
Id.
134. See Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1413 n.280; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 88 n.417,
89 n.422 and accompanying text; see also 42 Fed. Reg. 34,892, 34,892-93 (1977).
135. See 42 Fed. Reg. 34,892, 34,893 (1977); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 89; Hearings
on Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev. -Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1979 Before the
Subcomm. on HUD-Indep. Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, 264 (1978) [hereinafter 1979 Senate Appropriations Hearings].
136. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 89-90. CPSC staff recommended that the scope be
narrowed to the blade-contact hazard. Id. at 89.
137. See id. at 89-90; see also 43 Fed. Reg. 24,697, 23,697-98 (1978).
138. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 90; see also 43 Fed. Reg. 51,038, 51,038 (1978).
139. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 90; see also 43 Fed. Reg. 55,771, 55,772 (1978).
140. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 90.
141. See 44 Fed. Reg. 9990, 9990-10,037 (1979). Compare id. with 42 Fed. Reg. 23,052,
23,052-72 (1977) and the concise summary of CU's recommendations in Schwartz, supra
note 3, at 83-85. Cf. Schwartz, supra, at 90-92 (discussion of final rule and comparison
with CPSC's proposal and CU's recommendations).
142. See Southland Mower Co. v. CPSC, 619 F.2d 499, 526 (5th Cir. 1980). The Fifth
Circuit in Southland Mower held only that "part of the standard requiring the discharge-
chute area of power lawn mowers to pass a foot-probe test" was unsupported by substantial
evidence. Id. at 510. See generally Schwartz, supra note 3, at 92-93; Klayman, supra note
22, at 107-08 (more discussion of final standard and court challenge).
143. See Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 96-526, 94 Stat. 3044, 3050 (1980) (relating to congressional postponement); cf.
Hearings on Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.-ndep. Agencies of the House Appropri-
ations Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, 809 (1981) [hereinafter 1982 House Appropri-
ations Hearings] (statement of Rep. Boland) (postponement premised on industry production
cycle). See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 93-94 nn.477-78 and accompanying text (sources cited
discuss congressional instruction); cf. id. at 94 (subsequent history).
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The initiative was plagued by every problem that afflicted the other
proceedings and a number of its own, especially constant disagreement
over the technological feasibility of proposals; incessant, vigorous oppo-
sition engendered by the cost of recommended remedies; and the virtual
impossibility of securing consensus between the "consumer-oriented of-
feror" and the industry, which were "poles apart on fundamental is-
sues." 144
Agency personnel accorded the offeror's work considerable, but qual-
ified, praise. Several made general laudatory comments, saying that CU
was "incredibly effective" in that the offeror "got pretty much what it
wanted;' ' 4 "did an excellent job;' 1 4 6 and was "technically qualified to
run" the project as well as "was very knowledgeable about lawn mow-
ers."14
7
Others associated with the Commission have been more specific. The
preliminary staff evaluation stated that CU's "standard and accompanying
documents appeared" responsive to the CPSC's requirements, and that
CU treated "all hazards listed in the NOP, essentially addressed all
inadequacies in existing standards," and provided all necessary docu-
ments. 141 But the offeror's submission also was so complex that the staff
requested more time to analyze the material tendered. 149
An agency official found that CU did "one of the best jobs of seeing
the problem and correcting it [, producing] a very good package and
technical rationale," assuming that the offeror's view of risk was accu-
rate.Y0 The Project Monitor for the Commission was "very impressed
with the technical unfolding of the effort" and observed that the offeror
effectively managed the endeavor, assembled "very savvy technical peo-
ple," promoted "good technical interchange" and coordinated new test-
ing.' However, the agency official thought that CU's "staff was'drifting'
and'planning poorly' "at first but "solved many of its organizational
144. See id. at 95. It also could be argued that CPSC created more problems than it
remedied. See, e.g., infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
145. TI with CPSC employee 1.
146. TI with CPSC employee 2.
147. TI with CPSC employee 3.
148. OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-36. CU "addressed all hazards listed in the
NOP, essentially addressed all inadequacies in existing standards as listed in the NOP [,
and] provided all documents required or promised." Id.; accord Schwartz, supra note 3, at
83 & 85.
149. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 85.
150. TI with CPSC employee 4. The official added that CU did a "pretty straightforward
job of seeing the problem and correcting it as best it could [but] later most of the civilized
world saw the world differently than CU had, so maybe CU saw it wrong" and that many
deficiencies in the offeror process make it very unfair to judge funded participation on the
basis of offerors' work products. Id.
151. TI with CPSC employee 5. "Old enemies cooperated under the aegis of CU to
develop a new test method for evaluating thrown objects" and a "good deal of what was
in the proposed and final standard was what CU wanted." Id.
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problems," received greater industry cooperation, and "made substantial
progress" subsequently. 152 The monitor also believed that the offeror "tried
to do too much by treating all possible risks,"'15 3 even though he acknowl-
edged that "CU probably would have done a better job if the CPSC had
initially focused the hazards.' ' 5 4 Another staffer commented that the
offeror's standard was "not totally adequate to address the issues [and]
did not push industry enough,'"" while a medical officer said that CU
treated "major safety facets," although the CPSC had to so some "fine
tuning and a lot of independent research.' '156
The study conducted by the OPPE stated that all risks were treated
by the offeror but that large inefficient meetings hindered early progress
of proposed standard development and that there was insufficient infor-
mation flow among subcommittees as well as participatory imbalance. 157
The report also blamed the CPSC for some perceived deficiencies in the
standard development effort. The agency asked CU to address too many
hazards, especially ones for which there was limited documentable data
on injuries, while the CPSC failed to specify risks to be treated and
possible ways of handling them, to consider comprehensively existing data
and voluntary standards, and to provide clear guidance on citizen involve-
ment. 158
Four Commissioners identified these and the CPSC's "inadequate
front end analysis" and "hands-off" approach to, and adversarial rela-
tionship with, offerors as "major problems which plagued the offeror
process" initially. 59 One Chairman acknowledged that the Commissioners
bit "off more than we could reasonably chew in a reasonable time and
[often were] gagging on the magnitude of" the lawn mower project, 16°
while another agency head testified that the CPSC first tried "to build
the perfect power mower" but finally addressed the "most important
152. See Note, supra note 27, at 1208 n.192. An extra-agency evaluator who interviewed
the project monitor said that "much of CU's early difficulty was due to industry's refusal
to cooperate fully with the CU staff." Id.
153. TI with CPSC employee 5, supra note 151.
154. Id.; accord infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
155. TI with CPSC employee 6.
156. TI with CPSC employee 7.
157. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-31-32 & 36.
158. See id. at 3-3, 3-22; 4-3 to 4-4, 4-22; 13-1-2.
159. See Reauthorization of CPSA: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 199-201, 208
(1978) [hereinafter S.2796 Hearings] (statement of Chairman Byington); Hearings on Dep't
of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1978 Before the Subcomm.
on HUD-Indep. Agencies of the House Appropriations Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
4, 113-20 (1977) [hereinafter 1978 House Appropriations Hearings] (statements of Byington,
Comm'rs Kushner, Franklin & Pittle).
160. Hearings on Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations
for 1979 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Indep. Agencies of the House Appropriations
Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, 461 (1978) [hereinafter 1979 House Appropriations
Hearings] (statement of Chairman Byington).
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single hazard.' 1 6' Indeed, continual narrowing of the initiative's scope
may well attest to deficiencies in agency management. 162
The Commissioners have said little about the work of CU. One
Chairman characterized the offeror's suggestions as "regulatory overkill,"
due to the cost of a mechanism that CU recommended and the inclusion
in the offeror's submission of noise requirements absent supporting data. 163
A second chairman added that CU covered many risks so that CPSC had
to "define and narrow down the specific hazards" to be treated.164 Finally,
most of these assessors and others recognized that the statutory time
allotted for proposed standard development was woefully insufficient.1
6
Several reimbursed individuals who possessed technical expertise praised
CU while criticizing agency management and industry recalcitrance. One
of the technical experts remarked that the "offeror's work was generally
very good," that the CPSC staff believed that it was "really not supposed
to actively participate," and that "manufacturers fought regulation tooth
and nail.' '166 A physician agreed that the people and entities involved in
proposed standard development would debate for hours and need guidance
which CPSC monitors refused to provide and that industry retained much
expertise and data "subsequently used to oppose the standard."' 67 A
mechanical engineer said that CU's manager "did an outstanding job of
pulling everything together," in light of the CPSC's inexperience, "hands-
off" posture, and failure to secure necessary material as well as producers'
refusal to supply such data or to cooperate in other ways. 168 Another
person with technical skills was amazed that CU could provide any
documentation and stated that the offeror "did a reasonably good job,"
given the substantial "organization industry had, and money it spent, to
block standard development at every avenue" and agency inability to
"match producers' firepower or stonewalling.' ' 69 A fifth person thought
161. 1980 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 72, at 55 (statement of Chairman
King).
162. Continual narrowing has been traced most comprehensively in Schwartz, supra
note 3, at 85-92.
163. See S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 251 (statement of Chairman Simpson).
164. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 200 (statement of Chairman Byington).
165. See, e.g., id. at 208 (same); GAO STUDy, supra note 32, at App. I, p. 41 (CPSC
Response to GAO Study); House Offeror Report, supra note 33, at 7; cf. S. 2796 Hearings,
supra, note 159, at 21-22 (statement of Robert Goldstone); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 95
(statutory preference for performance, rather than design, requirements caused delay).
166. TI with funded participant 1.
167. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 29, 33 (statement of Robert Goldstone).
168. TI with funded participant 2. The party identified the difficulty of securing
necessary data from industry as a "significant handicap" for technical consumers and CU
and added that the "proceeding should be put in context" as one of the first in which
CPSC was experimenting with the innovative offeror process.
169. TI with funded participant 3. The party said that CU deserved a "B" grade for
its efforts; that the "amount of organization which industry had, and the amount of money
it spent, to fight the effort were beyond comprehension," and that a number of the CPSC
technical people were the "least qualified." Id.
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that CU tendered an "excellent proposal which treated all hazards" and
that its decisional process was "reasonably fair.'
70
Three CU employees concurred in some of the observations afforded
by the technical consumers. The Project Director found that the hardest
risks "to justify and remedy" were those documented least by the CPSC,
17
which supplied in-depth investigations supporting half the hazards and no
record of noise injuries; 72 that "ninety-five percent of the opinions ex-
pressed at committee meetings were controlled" by representatives of
producers, some of whom continuously opposed provisions designed to
"reduce blade stopping time;" and that the offeror's proposal was "nec-
essarily a compromise with industry.'1 7  A second official employed by
CU admitted that the offeror experienced difficulty securing industry
cooperation 174 and agency data. 75 The officer also claimed that the CPSC
afforded inadequate guidance and that its statute provided insufficient
time for proposed standard development.' 76 But the individual described
the effort as a learning process because for the first time many people,
"with very different interests, had to ... hammer out a standard.' ' 77 A
third employee of the offeror conceded that CU may have provided too
many options and reiterated that the CPSC could have better managed
the endeavor and that the agency offered too little guidance, especially
regarding the Commissioners' expectations. 17
Many industry representatives criticized CU's efforts.and CPSC's
administration, albeit for numerous reasons different than those enumer-
ated above. 179 Those involved in lawn mower production evinced concern
principally about agency failure to consider adequately voluntary stand-
ards, to discuss constructively possible requirements, and to educate suf-
170. TI with funded participant 4. The party added that CU's standard had "maybe
even been too broad." Id.
171. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-3 to 3-4.
172. See id.; TI with Bertram Strauss, CU Project Director.
173. See Deposition of Bertram Strauss, p. 209 (source of the material in the first
quotation), Greenwood v. McDonough Power Equip., 437 F. Supp. 707 (D. Kan. 1977),
reprinted in Schroer & Wulz, Lawn Iower Makers Shortcut Safety, 16 TRIAL 46, 48 (Nov.
1980) (same). Strauss TI, supra note 172 (source of the material in the second and third
quotation).
174. See CPSA Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection
and Fin. of the House Comm. On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
99 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 House CPSA Hearings] (statement of Peter Schuck). But see id.
at 106 (statement of Stanley Groner); infra text accompanying note 198 (industry did
cooperate).
175. See S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 24 (statement of Peter Schuck).
176. See Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 Go. L. J. 1, 62
n.341 (1982); 1975 House CPSA Hearings, supra note 174, at 95 (statement of Peter Schuck);
accord S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 24 (same).
177. See 1975 House CPSA Hearings, supra note 174, at 88, 92.
178. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 37, 43-47 (statement of Mark Silbergeld).
179. See, e.g., supra notes 158-61, 166-69 and accompanying text.
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ficiently the Commissioners and staff.8 0 In interviews and Congressional
hearings, the Executive Director of the OPEI and others did recite the
litany of deficiencies in the OPPE study;'" l identify as important, CPSC
failure to conduct necessary analyses before commencing, and to provide
CU proper direction during, the proposed standard development process;8 2
charge that agency staff preferred to monitor passively standard devel-
opment;' s3 and acknowledge that the time provided was inadequate.
8 4
Moreover, several employees of producers were realistic about the con-
straints imposed on CU,185 although a few of these representatives sug-
gested that the offeror be judged by the number of its recommendations
which were included in the final Commission rule. 8 6 Nonetheless, the
OPEI official and numerous representatives of manufacturing interests did
criticize CU in many ways. The offeror was said to lack the requisite
experience with lawn mowers, standard writing and product design 87 as
well as to have preconceptions and biases. 18 8 Representatives of producers
180. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 255 (statement of Dennis
Dix) (relating to the first criticism); TI with Dennis Dix, OPEI Executive Director (May 16,
1984) (same); TIs with industry representatives 1,2 (same); H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note
75, at 543 (statement of Dennis Dix) (relating to the second criticism); CPSC Reauthorization:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transp., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 107, 137 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Senate Reauthorization
Hearings] (statement of Dennis Dix) (same); 1981 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra,
at 107 (relating to the third criticism); Dix TI, supra (same); TI with industry representative
3 (same).
181. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 255-56 (statement of Dennis
Dix); accord id. at 259 (statement of OPEI General Counsel Mac Dunaway); TIs with several
additional industry representatives.
182. 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 256-57 (statement of Dennis
Dix); accord Dix TI, supra note 180; TI with industry representative 4; TIs with several
additional industry representatives.
183. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 255 (statement of Dennis
Dix); TIs with several additional industry representatives. See generally supra note 180
(citations to Dix statements for second proposition).
184. See Dix TI, supra note 180; Implementation of the CPSA; Hearings Before the
Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (Oct. 1977) [hereinafter Oct. 1977 Senate Oversight Hearings] (statement
of Philip Knox); TI with industry representative 5; TIs with several additional industry
representatives. OPEI's Executive Director also testified that CPSC seemed "locked in" to
a particular solution and that a "revolutionary concept of standard-development with much
apparent promise ha[d] been persistently abused and undermined by the Commission in the
most conspicuous manner." 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 256. See
supra note 180 (citations to Dix statements for second proposition).
185. See, e.g., TI with industry representative 3, supra note 180; TI with industry
representative 4, supra note 182; TI with industry representative 6.
186. See, e.g., TI with industry representative 1, supra note 180; TI with industry
representative 7.
187. See TI with industry representatives 1-3, supra note 181; TI with industry repre-
sentative 7, supra note 186; TI with industry representative 8.
188. See TI with industry representative 4, supra note 182; TI with industry represent-
ative 7, supra note 186; TI with industry representative 9; Knox statement, supra note 184.
1987]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
also criticized CU for failing to manage properly the project, establish
priorities, treat the principal hazard, perform technical work, listen to
industry, consider either operator behavior, consumer acceptance or needs,
or test or verify the restrictions the offeror proposed. 8 9 CU as well
allegedly submitted suggestions which were too design-oriented' 90 and that
might have impugned the integrity of the product.' 9' Industry's views were
epitomized by several representatives' characterization of CU as a "pub-
lishing house, not a manufacturer of lawn mowers." 192
Outside assessors have confirmed much that is said above. The Comp-
troller reported that the CPSC did not adequately inform CU about
technical support that should have been included in its recommendations
or monitor the offeror's progress, much less initiate corrective action
during proposed standard development when it appeared that CU was
proceeding improperly. 93 Professor Schwartz thought that CU had pre-
conceptions about potential solutions which were "too strong for the
Commissioners," while she identified deficiencies in the proposed standard
development process that the offeror might have remedied but rarely
blamed CU for them. 194 The professor also found that CPSC's NOP
"included almost all conceivable mower-related hazards," neither ranking
them nor setting priorities, so that CU apparently was to treat each
189. See, e.g., TI with industry representative 7, supra note 186 (relating to organization
and management); TI with industry representative 8, supra note 187 (same); TI with industry
representative 8, supra (relating to priority setting and identifying and treating principal
hazard); TI with industry representative 7, supra (relating to technical work); TI with
industry representative 9, supra note 188 (same); Dix TI, supra note 180 (relating listening
to manufacturers); TI with industry representative 7, supra (same); A Mower Safety Code
with Sharper Edge, Bus. WEEK 17 (Aug. 11, 1975) (statement of David McLaughlin, former
President, Toro Co.) (same); Dix TI, supra (relating to consideration of operator behavior,
consumer acceptance and needs); TI with industry representative 6, supra note (same); TIs
with industry representatives 1, 3, supra (same); TI with industry representative 2, supra
note 180 (relating to testing and verfying).
190. Dix TI, supra note 180; TI with industry representative 1, supra note 180; TI with
industry representative 9, supra note 188. See generally Schwartz, supra note 3, at 92-93.
191. Dix TI, supra note 180; TI with industry representative 1, supra note 180; TI with
industry representative 8, supra note 187; TI with industry representative 9, supra note 188.
Numerous other persons whom I interviewed concurred in a number of these criticisms.
Moreover, nearly everyone whom I interviewed offered additional specific criticisms that
were not mentioned by anyone else.
192. Remarks to that effect were made by numerous industry representatives.
193. GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at 9-10. The Comptroller General did not assess CU's
work.
194. See TI with Teresa Schwartz (May 2, 1984) (relating to preconceptions). Professor
Schwartz found standard development complicated by the CPSA's requirements regarding
extensive public participation, substantial evidence and performance standards. See Schwartz,
supra note 3, at 95; cf. id. at 62-68, 73-95 (comprehensive analysis of complications she
identified); id. at 79-95 (comprehensive analysis of CU's role). But cf. 1981 Senate Reau-
thorization Hearings, supra note 180, at 246 (statement of Lester Lave) (CPSC analysis
"much better than anything in the past" and certainly "very helpful in arriving at the kind
of standards they had").
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equally, and these difficulties came "home to roost in the evaluation
phase."' 95 Nonetheless, the analyst concluded that the time required for
standard development did "not seem so unreasonable," because private
standards writing organizations normally take several years to complete
comparable projects. 96 Professor Hamilton testified that the CPSC con-
sidered CU's submission unsatisfactory, authorized additional costly stand-
ard development work, rewrote the standard tendered by the offeror and
issued a proposal quite different from it 197 but remarked that deficiencies
were not attributable to inadequate procedures, as "there was extensive
cooperation from producers [and] extensive inputs from all interested
groups." 98
Given the complications that attended this initiative, work performed
by CU appears creditable. Moreover, the problems which did arise can be
ascribed at least as much to CPSC inexperience, industry recalcitrance and
the difficulties inherent in experimenting with complex, untested admin-
istrative procedures as to offeror deficiencies.
Appraisals of the input provided by reimbursed individuals were mixed.
A CPSC employee stated that disparities of perspective between funded
members of the public and manufacturers made the proceeding "murder
to live through" and that some citizens helped create an "abrasive at-
mosphere."'' 99 The officer remarked that one technical person "was a very
vocal, active consumer representative" and much that the individual wanted
was included in the final agency rule. 20° That official's views were shared
by additional Commission staffers,20' one of whom also thought that
numerous citizens "contributed significantly," specifically identifying three
others who were very diligent and offered valuable input. 20 2 The Project
Monitor for the CPSC observed that "overall public participation was
helpful," that CU received "skilled nonindustry technical help," and that
people possessing such expertise made important contributions and gen-
erally were more effective than lay consumers, who were a "little impres-
195. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 78, 89; cf. id. at 62-68, 77-95 (comprehensive
analysis of CPSC's role).
196. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 95.
197. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 349, 351, 355 (statement of
Professor Hamilton).
198. See id. at 351.
199. TI with CPSC employee 1.
200. Id.
201. One said he "played a very important role, was very hard working and tenacious
and made sure his fairly reasonable points got across." TI with CPSC employee 2.
202. TI with CPSC employee 3. The official thought the person above "worked tirelessly
to insure consumers were afforded protections CU intended to provide;" that a second
person "for little money did a hell of a lot of work," especially on thrown objects testing,"
and that a CPSC consultant's later research "would not have gotten far without his work;"
that a third individual "built and maintained, a constituency for lawnmower standards [by]
illustrating the human tragedy associated with blade contact;" and that a fourth citizen
"provided an important balance to industry participants" when voting. Id.
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sionable." 203 The monitor added, however, that lay consumers were
"extremely useful in warning and labeling issues," helping everyone ap-
preciate how users handle lawn mowers. 204 Another CPSC officer believed
that citizens "managed to be on a par with, and had as much influence
as, industry.' '205
The Project Director for CU said that individuals made helpful con-
tributions, imposing more safety requirements than manufacturers; that
those who had "never used mowers" offered "some pretty good input,"
and that one technical person "worked tremendously and contributed
substantially," but the CU employee found that some individuals stopped
participating, were "leeches" or "had a financial interest." 206 The Project
Director's assistant stated that "consumer participation was quite good"
and that certain recommendations made by citizens appeared in the pro-
posal that CU submitted to the CPSC while a few of the suggestions
remained in the final rule. 20 7 The assistant acknowledged that there was
some turnover among the funded individuals involved in proposed standard
development but contended that it "was not a problem in terms of
continuity.' '208
Compensated parties who had technical expertise found that public
involvement was effective and of high quality. One of these reimbursed
people characterized funded participation as a "good use of taxpayer
money that let the agency hear what the average person thought and
provided alternative viewpoints backed up by the hard data on which
CPSC decisions are based," thus helping it "do a better job. ' 20 9 A second
individual with technical skills claimed that "some of the really major
inputs and most significant suggestions came from completely nontechnical
people," whose adversarial questioning forced others to think.2 10 He added
that those persons with technical experience worked for much "less than
their normal rates [and were] pretty well qualified academically but may
have lacked practical background;" one of the individuals was "very
vocal, understood the political process, and provided beneficial input"
and two other technical people "participated in testing that helped develop
203. TI with CPSC employee 4.
204. Cf. id. ("consumer sounding board" convened to address controversial CU rec-
ommendation on "dead man" controls less "useful than other consumer participation").
See generally Schwartz, supra note 3, at 86 n.391 and accompanying text (discussion of
consumer sounding board).
205. TI with CPSC employee 5.
206. TI with Bertram Strauss (May 2, 1984).
207. TI with George Papritz (Apr. 4, 1984). The CU official cited a consumer's
"suggestion that lawnmowers not be activated when in reverse, [which] was included in
CU's proposal and remained in the final standard." Id.
208. Id. But see infra note 232 and accompanying text.
209. TI with funded participant 1, supra note 166. Cf. id. (funding "very good use of
taxpayer money").
210. TI with funded participant 3, supra note 169.
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a stopping time based on human factors. ' 211 A third person possessing
technical expertise found that "public participation was helpful and mean-
ingful" and that some lay consumer "input was very valuable," citing as
examples their contributions to development of product warnings and
successful challenges to industry contentions that proposed requirements
could not be met.212 But the technical expert cautioned that these partici-
pants need help in understanding technical issues and with that assistance
they "can be very effective and afford insights that engineers just do not
have." 213 Another citizen with technical training said that individuals had
"significant impact but not uniformly" because of their inability to "spend
the time necessary" or to "offer substantive counter-arguments," and the
person recounted difficulties that he encountered in attempting to "secure
meaningful data with which to oppose industry contentions or help non-
technical participants," problems that led to "unjustifiable compromise
on numerical limitations," omission of potential requirements and occa-
sional "shooting from the hip. ' 21 4 Similarly, a reimbursed doctor asserted
that technically-oriented consumers could not obtain necessary informa-
tion, so that they had "no way of verifying" essential technical data
supplied by producers but had to "accept it on faith [or] go to extremes
to find otherwise. ' 215 The physician attributed these difficulties partly to
resource disparities between full-time, salaried industry representatives and
part-time, underpaid citizens.
216
Quite a few funded participants who did not have technical skills
agreed with the last statement, and some of these persons concurred in
numerous views of the technical consumers.217 One concern voiced by
several lay participants was a feeling of inferiority vis-a-vis employees of
manufacturers who had been involved actively in mower design for many
years. 21 A reimbursed nontechnical individual did say that citizens were
"very active, were listened to and won some issues." 21 9
Industry-oriented observers were less complimentary. One stated that
a compensated engineer "made a very good contribution," especially in
thrown objects testing, and that "his data were used in developing CU's
standard. '20 A second person employed by a producer expressed "high
regard for technical public participants," indicating that they and manu-
211. Id.
212. TI with funded participant 4, "upra note 170.
213. Id.
214. TI with funded participant 2, supra note 168.
215. Consumer Participation Meeting, supra note 35, at 91, reprinted in Regulatory
Reform Hearings, supra note 66, at 35-36 (statement of Robert Goldstone).
216. Id.; accord Consumer Participation Meeting, supra note 35, at 90.
217. See, e.g.,-Consurer Participation Meeting, supra note 35, at 59, 135-37, 139.
218. See id. at 97-98, 136.
219. Id. at 117.
220. TI with industry representative 3, supra note 180.
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facturing representatives respected and understood each other, 21 and thought
that there were many "good ordinary consumers who spent time" edu-
cating themselves, who helped "technical people get a better perspective"
by requiring explanations and who "did an excellent job" with editorial
projects.22 Another industry employee found "great value in having prod-
uct users who could see the practical problems associated with the concepts
being put forth" and exercised a "lot of common sense."' ' 3
But some of these evaluators and numerous others involved in lawn
mower manufacturing contended that few of the citizens were as neutral
or as competent as they might have been. Those consumers who claimed
to possess technical proficiency were said to be promoting their economic
self-interest either as potential expert witnesses in products liability
litigation2 4 or as developers of potential solutions to mower hazards 22 or
to have limited understanding of the product. 2 6 Some lay consumers
allegedly were biased because they knew people injured in lawn mower
accidents. 227 Correspondingly, a number of nontechnical citizens were said
to have contributed nothing,z2 s delayed progress by asking irrelevant ques-
tions or by seeking too many explanations, 229 attended meetings irregularly,
or ceased participating when the work became too complex or the cost of
involvement became too great, or they lost interest or believed that
everything possible in terms of improved product safety had been accom-
plishe.d. 23
0
Few extra-agency evaluators have assessed the contributions of reim-
bursed consumers. Professor Schwartz said that CU's bias made it "dif-
ficult to judge individuals' influence" and that resource discrepancies
between the industry and citizens, who could not "hire consultants or
221. TI with industry representative 4, supra note 182; TIs with several other industry
representatives.
222. TI with industry representative 4, supra note 182.
223. TI with industry representative 2, supra note 180; accord TIs with other industry
representatives. Many thought that neutral, competent consumers could contribute to stand-
ard development but emphasized the difficulty of securing such persons.
224. A number of technical public participants have testified as experts.
225. I could identify only one technical participant who possibly had some interest by
virtue of his appearance in Congressional hearings on behalf of a licensor of lawn mower
safety devices. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 20. But so many industry represen-
tatives alluded to persons with such interests that there may well have been numerous others.
See, e.g., Dix TI, supra note 180; TI with industry representative 3, supra note 180.
226. See, e.g., TI with industry representative 2, supra note 180. University professors
were particularly the object of criticism of this participant and several other industry
representatives.
227. See, e.g., TI with industry representative 8, supra note 187.
228. See, e.g., TI with industry representative 1, supra note 180. Homemakers were
especially the object of scorn of this participant and several other industry representatives.
229. See, e.g., Dix TI, supra note 180; TI with industry representative 6, supra note
185.
230. See, e.g., Dix TI, supra note 180; TI with industry representative 4, supra note
182; TI industry representative 6, supra note 185.
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research and testing experts," meant that the consumers "had to accept'on
'faith' basic technical information that industry participants supplied.''231
Moreover, she found that the involvement of individuals lacked the con-
tinuity of producers and decreased over time, thus requiring recruitment
of "new consumer participants [which was] "very inefficient.
' 232
The effectiveness and quality of compensated input subsequent to
proposed standard development also were mixed. 233 In the agency's 1977
hearing, a lay consumer depended primarily on anecdotes and personal
opinion to advocate product controls whose cost she could not say pur-
chasers would accept and which requirements were rejected in the CPSC's
proposed and final regulations. 234 The Commissioners asked the individual
"few questions because [her] points" had "been before the Commission"
for a considerable period of time.23s A funded engineer provided what can
be characterized fairly as a "wandering monologue," which the CPSC
afforded little treatment in its proposal. 236 Another individual who pos-
sessed technical expertise criticized the agency's decision to delete from
the Commission's proposal injury-reducing requirements, included in CU's
submission and for which technology was available, while the technical
witness identified certain deficiencies in testing conducted by the Com-
mission's consultant. 237 In the 1978 agency meeting, the person argued
that brake clutches would improve safety substantially and that the mech-
anisms were available theoretically and could be applied practically to
mowers, using testing he had performed to challenge industry contentions
regarding reliability. 23 And, in 1979, the CPSC specifically relied on the




In October, 1974, the American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM), a nonprofit corporation which develops "standards on charac-
teristics and performance of materials, products, systems, and services,"
231. See Schwartz TI, supra note 194 (material in the first quotation); Schwartz, supra
note 3, at 82 n.356 (material in the remainder). See generally supra notes 215-16 and
accompanying text.
232. Schwartz TI, supra note 194; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 82. But cf. supra text
accompanying note 208 (consumer turnover not a problem in terms of continuity). See
generally OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-31 (discussion of turnover).
233. See Transcript in re Oral Presentation of Data, Views, and Arguments on Proposed
Standards for Power Lawn Mowers, Washington, D.C. (June 13, 1977) [hereinafter 1977
Transcript]; Transcript of Public Meeting on Power Lawn Mower Brake/Clutch Reliability,
Bethesda, Md. (Dec. 12, 1978) [hereinafter 1978 Transcript].
234. See 1977 Transcript, supra note 233, at 121-29.
235. See id. at 129 (statement of Comm'r Kushner).
236. See id. at 237-57.
237. See id. at 132-57.
238. See 1978 Transcript, supra note 233, at 63-79.
239. See 44 Fed. Reg. 9989, 10,012 (1979).
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was selected by the CPSC to write requirements associated with match-
books. 240 The ASTM sought help from the National Consumer's League
(NCL) in facilitating public involvement and agreed to pay for expenses
incurred by citizens. 24' The NCL assembled a "consumer caucus" which
had expert consultants, and it produced a position paper that served as
the starting point for much of the proposed standard development effort.
242
On the twelve days that ASTM held meetings, fifteen consumers, who
constituted more than half of the offeror's working group, caucused
separately to analyze technical issues and to ascertain areas of agreement
and compromise among themselves and others involved in proposed stand-
ard development. 243 ASTM's proposal which was drafted by consensus,
included numerous ideas suggested by the consumer caucus and was
tendered on time in February, 1975.244 The staff of the CPSC rejected
and modified some of the offeror's recommendations 24 and the Commis-
240. See Regulations Governing ASTM Committees: Society Scope (Sept. 1973), re-
printed in Note, supra note 27, at 1179 n.38 (discussion of ASTM's description); 40 Fed.
Reg. 1298, 1298-99 (1975) (relating to ASTM's selection); ef. Hearings on Dep't of Housing
and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1976 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-
Indep. Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 2, 905
(1975) [hereinafter 1976 Senate Appropriations Hearings] (only other offer "received from
Computerized Biomechanical Analysis, Inc., a research laboratory"). See OPPE REPORT,
supra note 31, at D-20 (only comprehensive offer from ASTM, and it was selected to be
the offeror); id. at D-20, D-21 & D-21-27 (discussion of the proceeding's background, the
structure of ASTM's working organization and the proceeding's development phase); cf. 39
Fed. Reg. 32,050, 32,051-52 (1974) (NOP). See Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1338-39, 1338-
45, 1412-16 (helpful discussion of ASTM, similar voluntary standards writing organizations,
the work of ASTM and other such organizations as offerors and the role of nongovernmental
standards in the development of mandatory federal health and safety standards).
241. See Note, supra note 27, at 1193 n.123 & 1208 n.193; 1977 House Oversight
Hearings, supra note 34, at 260 (statement of David Swankin); cf. Note, supra note 27, at
1208 n. 193 (although some consumer participants "were not compensated and others received
only travel expenses, several were paid fees," as were a few ASTM technical experts); infra
note 396 (description of NCL, which was offeror in the miniature Christmas tree lights
proceeding). Ironically, ASTM and NCL were unsuccessful offeror applicants in architectural
glazing. See Hamilton supra note 35, at 1413 n.282. And had NCL been successful, it would
have selected ASTM "to manage and house the project." Note, supra note 27, at 1179. Cf.
S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 91-92; The Consumer Product Testing Act: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Commerce Comm. on S.643, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 89-90 (1975) [hereinafter S.643 Hearings] (statement of David Swankin) (discussion,
not provided in text below, by NCL's project director of NCL's participation).
242. See S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, at 89; S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 91-
92; cf. Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1416 (more than majority of ASTM committee was
consumers).
243. See Note, supra note 27, at 1193 n.123; S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, at 88-89
(statement of David Swankin); S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 92 (same); Hamilton,
supra note 35, at 1416.
244. See S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, at 89 (statement of David Swankin); S.644
Hearings, supra note 77, at 92 (same); cf. 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34,
at 352-53 (statement of Professor Hamilton) (discussion of "consensus process").
245. See OPPE REPoRT, supra note 31, at D-22; cf. 1977 House Oversight Hearings,
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sioners were quite critical of the material submitted, even requesting that
the ASTM supplement its work by preparing a narrative technical ra-
tionale. 246 Nonetheless, in April, 1976, the CPSC promulgated a proposed
regulation that incorporated most of the offeror's suggestions, 247 while
several stringent provisions included in that proposal by the Commissioners
and recommended by ASTM were omitted from the May, 1977, final
rule,24 so that it resembled a preexisting voluntary standard issued by the
ASTM. 249 These machinations suggest that the need for mandatory controls
might have been debatable. 250 The agency regulation may have lacked
substantiation and major provisions of the rule were invalidated because
they were not supported by substantial evidence. 25'
supra note 34, at 353 (statement of Professor Hamilton) (ASTM's submission stringent,
including controversial burn time requirement industry opposed). See OPPE REPORT, supra
note 31, at D-26-27 (comprehensive list of staff criticisms, including deficiencies as to
supporting justification, testing and risk to children); accord 1977 House Oversight Hearings,
supra at 331 (statement of Allan Saeks). But cf. OPPE REPORT, supra at D-24 (ASTM
submission directly addressed all NOP hazards except risks to children which ASTM claimed
were addressed indirectly); S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 125 (statement of William
Cavanaugh) (ASTM submitted complete record and documentation).
246. See infra notes 255, 257 and accompanying text; 41 Fed. Reg. 14,112, 14,117-20
(1976) (modification of ASTM submission in CPSC proposed rule). But cf. infra text
accompanying note 247 (proposal incorporated most ASTM recommendations).
247. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-22; 41 Fed. Reg. 14,113, 14,114-15 (1976).
CPSC's proposal "adopted most of the ASTM proposed standard but added novel and
complex provisions relating to child-proof covers." Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1414.
248. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22,656, 22,660-65 (1977). The most notable omission the Com-
missioners included was the proposal on child-proof covers. See id. at 22,660; Authorizations
and Other Amendments to the CPSA: Hearings on H.R. 10,819 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Protection and Fin. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978) [hereinafter H.R. 10,819 Hearings] (statement of Comm'r
Franklin). The most notable omission ASTM recommended was that the burn time proposal
be deleted because of CPSC questions about technical feasibility and manufacturer ability
to satisfy it and industry opposition. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22,656, 22,660-61 (1977); Harter,
supra note 176, at 95 n.526; 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 353 (statement
of Professor Hamilton); Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1414 n.286, 1416; cf. id. at 1414
(CPSC proposal received many adverse comments). See generally Harter, supra at 94-95.
249. See Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1414; 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note
34, at 353-354 (statement of Professor Hamilton); TI with CPSC employee 1; cf. infra note
251 and accompanying text (resemblance may have been even closer after standard's major
provisions were judicially invalidated).
250. This was true of other products chosen for regulation. See, e.g., infra notes 319,
362-63 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text (relating to substantiation); 1977
House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 354 (colloquy between Rep. Eckhardt and
Professor Hamilton) (same); H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 58 (statement of
Rep. Eckhardt) (same); accord TIs with several CPSC employees; see also D.D. Bean and
Sons Co. V . CPSC, 574 F.2d 643, 650-51 (1st Cir. 1978) (relating to invalidation). In D.D.
Bean, the First Circuit invalidated the performance requirements but sustained the general
or design requirements. CPSC subsequently deleted the standard's invalidated portions and
proceeded with enforcement mechanisms. See Hearings on Dep't of Housing and Urban
Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1980 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Indep.
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Appraisals by the CPSC of the ASTM were positive and realistic. One
Commissioner testified that a "totally unexpected, useful and novel ap-
proach was stimulated by the offeror." 25 2 A Chairman said that ASTM
developed a "pretty good standard," given the constraints. 253 The Chair-
man admitted, however, that the CPSC "did a disservice to" ASTM by
requiring compliance with the ninety-day limitation to test the law2 4 and
that the offeror may have failed to address adequately child-resistant
packaging, despite pursuing an approach that was "completely consistent"
with resolution of the issue.2 . 5 Although another Commissioner acknowl-
edged that the ASTM's submission was "innovative" and "suffered from
the extreme haste of [meeting] the statutory deadline,1 25 6 he said that the
CPSC consumed 524 days essentially putting it "in a form that made
sense, had a technical rationale, and could be defended in court.1
257
One agency staffer thought that ASTM tendered a product which the
offeror believed was responsive to CPSC instructions, but the submission
evoked "such stiff industry opposition" that much of it was rejected and
unfairly discredited. 2 8 A second Commission employee found that "ASTM
had a lot of technical competence" and that the offeror "did a good job"
of assembling an "extremely good group of consumers" in a way that
afforded them focus and organization, thus enhancing their efficacy, as
well as of completing so expeditiously a "task of that size, considering
the obstacles" created principally by agency monitors who provided in-
sufficient ground work, afforded little guidance, and even refused to
answer questions .259 Similarly, the Report prepared by the OPPE observed
that the ASTM's submission addressed all hazards in the agency NOP
except risk to children, which was treated indirectly and that ASTM's
proposal included deficiencies, most of which were attributable to inade-
Agencies of the House Appropriations Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 417-18 (1979)
[hereinafter 1980 House Appropriations Hearings] (statement of CPSC General Counsel
Andrew Krulwich); 42 Fed. Reg. 53,709 (1977) (same); cf. TIs with several CPSC employees
(remaining requirements are virtually worthless and cost alone prevented repeal). See generally
infra note 328.
252. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 58 (statement of Comm'r Franklin).
253. Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 66, at 34; 1977 House Oversight Hearings,
supra note 34, at 251.
254. See Hearings on Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropria-
tions for 1976 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Indep. Agencies of the House Appropriations
Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, 372 (1975) [hereinafter 1976 House Appropriations
Hearings].
255. See S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 249-50, 252-53.
256. See 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 118; 1977 House
Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 251 (statements of Comm'r Pittle).
257. See supra, note 256 (two sources cited).
258. TI with CPSC employee 2. The official explained that the Commissioners, especially
Chairman Simpson, initially desired stringent controls and that ASTM "listened carefully"
producing requirements that it believed were responsive. Id.
259. TI with CPSC employee 3.
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quate CPSC monitoring. 260 Although Commission staff responsible for
analyzing the material tendered by the ASTM recommended many
changes,26' a number of these suggested alterations were rejected in the
final rule which incorporated numerous ideas provided by the offeror.
262
Two industry representatives found that the ASTM "did an excellent
job" in preparing the standard, in meeting the needs of the CPSC, in
managing the project-especially the committee system 263-and in persuad-
ing the Justice Department to relent on a longstanding antitrust consent
decree, which enabled producers to discuss technology and conduct round
robin testing.264 A third person affiliated with manufacturing believed that
lifting the decree was all ASTM had achieved, 265 while a fourth such
individual thought the offeror's work was "not very professional. '266
Although few aligned with industry mentioned the CPSC, a fifth repre-
sentative of producers found that agency staff were good, fair and available
when needed. 267
The Managing Director of ASTM testified that the offeror's submission
would have reduced significantly matchbook hazards and that ASTM
provided the Commission with complete supporting documentation and a
comprehensive record. 26 18 The offeror's Managing Director admitted, how-
ever, that ASTM tendered the standard after attaining an "achievable
threshold," while indicating areas for future work269 and that time con-
straints could have caused "management and technical errors," did create
"bad group dynamics," and made proposed standard development very
expensive. 270 He also suggested that the CPSC afford offerors more guid-
ance, especially initial hazard analysis, and praised agency staff for "out-
standing cooperation." ' 27' The person responsible for managing the
contributions made by the NCL thought that some offeror "work was
260. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-5, 3-8, 3-9; cf. id. at 3-5; Schwartz, supra
note 3, at 65 n.232 and accompanying text (for three hazards in NOP, CPSC "had so little
injury evidence" as to make their existence questionable).
261. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
263. TIs with industry representatives 1,2.
264. See TI with industry representative 1, supra note 263.
265. See TI with industry representative 3.
266. See TI with industry representative 4.
267. TI with industry representative 5.
268. See S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 121 (statement of William Cavanaugh)
(appearance of first claim); id. at 125 (appearance of second claim).
269. See id. at 121; accord OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-22; 1976 House
Appropriations Hearings, supra note 254, at 372 (statement of Chairman Simpson). But
ASTM also asked CPSC to "publish the submitted standard as an interim measure,"
suggesting many areas for fruitful research. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-22;
accord S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 121; 1976 House Appropriations Hearings, supra
at 372 (statement of Chairman Simpson).
270. See S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, at 115; S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at
121-22 (statements of William Cavanaugh).
271. See S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 122-23.
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very good" and that other work, "ASTM's science and economics," for
instance, was not.272 But the manager found that "overall it did a good
job" given this industry's peculiarities, ASTM's inexperience in writing
technical rationales to support standards and agency staff's "silent mon-
itoring." 27"
Citizens' assessment of the offeror generally were complimentary. Two
individuals believed that ASTM "did a good job," tendering "quite thor-
ough" requirements, 274 "creating and organizing procedures" and "balanc-
ing industry and consumers." '275 But two other citizen participants found
the atmosphere more antagonistic than adversarial 2 76 and a fifth person
said that manufacturers often "held back economic data."
'
27
Outside evaluations of the ASTM differed. Professor Hamilton found
that the possibility of industry vetoing requirements developed in the manner
that these were did not materialize27 8 and ascribed ASTM's timely completion
of proposed standard development to the "reservoir of technical knowledge
and skill in its membership. '"2 9 Professor Schwartz stated that the CPSC
"substantially revised" the offeror's suggestions, partly because of agency
mistakes, 2 0 while the Comptroller General said that "statutory time frames"
precluded ASTM completion of "certain desirable technical work."
'28 '
It is important to remember that the ASTM operated under severe
constraints. 212 The temporal restriction and the difficulty of quickly drafting
a proposed standard were significant complications.2 3 The CPSC first failed
to specify all risks and to provide adequate hazard data, so that the offeror
272. See TI with David Swankin [hereinafter Swankin TI I].
273. See TI with David Swankin [hereinafter Swankin TI II]. ASTM's submission "was
done like a voluntary standards organization and so lacked a rationale" and CPSC employees
"sat back during standard development," later criticizing the submission. Id.; cf. infra notes
289-292 and accompanying text (industry's peculiarities).
274. See TIs with funded participants 1, 2.
275. See id.
276. See TIs with funded participants 3, 4.
277. See TI with funded participant 5.
278. See Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1416.
279. Id.
280. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 88.
281. See GAO STUDY, supra note 32, at 41.
282. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 94 (first four offeror proceedings begun within five
month period, so CPSC "did not learn of its mistakes in one project in time to avoid them
in another").
283. See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text. ASTM completed the project in 92
days. See Apr. 1977 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 78, at 28 (statement of William
Cavanaugh); cf. S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 121 (same); 1978 House Appropriations
Hearings, supra note 159, at 118 (statement of Comm'r Pittle) (timely completion due to
ASTM's wish to ascertain whether its procedures were adequately responsive). In fairness,
timely completion may well have compromised the quality of ASTM's submission.
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"had to initiate and develop its own risk analysis." 2-4 As to some hazards
the Commission identified, there were minimal supporting data; indeed, for
three hazards there was "so little evidence of injury as to make" their
existence questionable.2 5 Other hazards could not be treated rapidly or
remedied cheaply. 2 6 Deficient agency guidance also hindered expeditious
development of the proposed standard.2 7 Moreover, conflicts between con-
sumers and manufacturers created difficulty.288 Furthermore, the peculiarities
of the industry created complications. The industry consisted of one major
company, and this factor "severely limited" the availability of data.289 The
manufacturers also lacked "analytical expertise and testing facilities" which
the ASTM needed because it "had no competence in matchbook technol-
ogy." 290 The industry as well was under a consent decree that complicated
data gathering and communications 291 and was producing a commodity
which was not amenable to economical standardization.292 In short, given
the constraints, especially as to time, the ASTM performed competently,
completing proposed standard development more expeditiously than other
offerors. 293
Citizen involvement received mixed reviews, particularly from agency
employees. One staffer found the caucus was an "extremely good group
[with] focus and organization which contributed a great deal" and helped
individuals be more effective than in other proceedings. 294 The evaluator
observed that each citizen worked very hard, although the effort expended
was not necessarily "seen in the final product," while the assessor stated
that some consumers were excellent arbitrators, such as a public relations
specialist who "could get agreement between conflicting groups" and a
retired engineer who insured that "technical work approached reality." 295
A second Commission employee thought that many individuals "could not
understand their suggestions' economic implications" or appreciate the
284. S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 122 (statement of William Cavanaugh); accord,
OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-13; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 65 n.233.
285. See supra, note 260.
286. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 64-65; infra note 292 and accompanying text.
287. Many have recognized that CPSC assumed a hands off approach. See, e.g., H.R.
10819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 58 (statement of Comm'r Franklin); S.644 Hearings, supra
note 77, at 123 (statement of William Cavanaugh); supra note 260 and accompanying text.
But cf. S.644 Hearings, at 122-23 (CPSC staff praised for cooperation).
288. See, e.g., TI with industry representative 3, supra note 265; supra notes 276-77 and
accompanying text.
289. Swankin TI I, supra note 272 ("If you took out Diamond Match Company, the
industry was comprised of small companies that did not even have economic divisions").
290. See OPPE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 4-11; S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, at 116
(statement of William Cavanaugh); cf. OPPE REPoRT, supra, at 4-13, 6-6 (industry's technically
unsophisticated nature partly responsible for inadequate ASTM technical support).
291. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
292. See Swankin TI I, supra note 272.
293. See supra note 283.
294. TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 259.
295. Id.
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"finer technical points" involved in potential regulation of matchbooks,
although these were "not very complex. ' 296 A third staffer said that "caucus
members did a lousy job" because they demanded increased stringency in
terms of proposed controls without supplying support for more rigorous
requirements .
297
The Project Manager for the ASTM found citizen activity "quite
significant," emphasizing that consumers had much "experience, made
matchbook injuries more real" and required ASTM and industry to propose
a more stringent standard than they would have.29 The Project Manager
also described as "exactly the kind of input we wanted" one party's
"statewide survey of fire marshals;" the contribution provided a "tremen-
dous amount of information" that would otherwise have cost "thousands
of dollars and many hours of time."' 29 But he did admit that individuals
were more helpful in pointing out, rather than solving, technical problems.: °
The Managing Director for the ASTM described consumers as "very
heroic people," who "quickly learned" matchbook technology.30' The NCL's
manager said that public involvement was "pretty good and better than
any" which had occurred previously at the CPSC,302 and that citizens used
critical questioning techniques characteristic of good investigative report-
ing. 30 3 Moreover, this evaluator asserted that the consumer caucus document,
which was prepared "after seven weeks of discussion and study and before
any" effort was undertaken to draft a proposed standard, served as the
point of departure for much subsequent work, requiring industry for the
first time to justify why it could not comply with consumer requests,3 °4 as
well as the source of much which the CPSC "finally adopted in its
regulation.'
'305
One extra-agency assessor found that most caucus members were not
"technically knowledgeable" and that those who were more well versed in
296. TI with CPSC employee 4.
297. TI with CPSC employee 5. The individual recited the oft-told story in the text
accompanying note 316, infra.
298. TI with Bernard Corrigan. Examples he cited were the message and bum-time
requirements. CPSC staff found that the former would "have severe economic effects and
provide little benefit" and the Commissioners "excluded them from the proposed standards."
OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-26.
299. OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-26.
300. Id.
301. See S.644 Hearings, supra note 77, at 122-23, 125; S.643 Hearings, supra note 241,
at 115 (statements of William Cavanaugh).
302. Swankin TI I, supra note 272.
303. Id.
304. See id.; S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, at 89 (statement of David Swankin). For
example, "technical backup" enabled consumers to evaluate independently manufacturers'
contention that "certain chemicals would create a serious toxicity problem." S.643 Hearings,
at 90.
305. See S.644 Heaiings, supra note 77, at 92; Swankin TI I, supra note 273; cf. S.643
Hearings, supra note 241, at 88-90; S.644 Hearings, supra at 91-92, 95-96 (additional discussion
by Swankin of consumer involvement).
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the technical aspects of matchbook regulation, or were more forceful, could
have dominated the remainder.3 °6 The individual also contended that citizens
were responsible for a controversial requirement included in the ASTM's
submission that ultimately was rejected by the CPSC.1 7 Another outside
evaluator considered the caucus position paper "very worthwhile [and] a
good precedent for consumer participation in standard-making."3 °0
Many industry observers were less positive. Several found that citizens,
while well-intentioned, knew little about the product or its manufacture and
lacked appreciation for the difficulty of complying with restrictions that
they voted to impose.A°9 Some of these analysts and others thought that
consumers were too partial, premising their decisions on emotions or ide-
alism, 10 and that the caucus encouraged "bloc voting," which did not
always reflect the technical merits of the questions at issue.
311
Funded citizens were "much more satisfied with their performance and
influence than" those reimbursed participants who were involved in the
architectural glazing proceeding.3 12 Many of the individuals believed that
consumers were very effective, claiming that they "dragged industry into
the twentieth century"31 3 and ultimately had more impact than manufactur-
ers.314 But these observers and others acknowledged that citizens sometimes
agreed to propositions which were not premised on adequate technical
data.31 Indeed, the matchbook initiative may be epitomized by the oft-
recounted story of voting on "burn-times of eight, twelve, fifteen and
twenty seconds," when there had been no "showing of impact of burn time
variances on reduction of injuries.
'31 6
4. Swimming Pool Slides
In January, 1975, the CPSC selected the National Swimming Pool
Institute (NSPI) to draft a standard governing swimming pool slides.317 The
306. See Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1416.
307. See id. at 1414, 1416. He was speaking of the burn time requirement.
308. The outside assessor was Arnold Elkind, chair of the NCPS. See S.644 Hearings,
supra note 77, at 92. It is important to remember the constraints under which consumers
labored. See, e.g., id. at 122-23; S.643 Hearings, supra note 241, at 115 (statements of William
Cavanaugh).
309. See, e.g., TIs with industry representatives 1, 2, supra note 263; TI with industry
representative 6.
310. See, e.g., TIs with industry representatives 4, 5, supra notes 266-67.
311. See, e.g., TIs with industry representatives 1, 2, supra note 263; TI with industry
representative 3, supra note 265.
312. Note, supra note 27, at 1209 text accompanying n.199. This observation seems
premised primarily upon the fact that consumers worked much less "in concert" in the glass,
than in the matchbook, proceeding. See id. at 1199, 1209 n.199.
313. Consumer Participation Meeting, supra note 35, at 104.
314. See, e.g., id. at 104-05, 115, 117.
315. See, e.g., id. at 84.
316. See Memorandum to Commissioners, "A Constructive Criticism of § 7 Proceedings,"
at 5, from funded participant 6.
317. See 40 Fed. Reg. 3311, (1975).
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Institute was the unanimous choice of neither the agency staff nor the
Commissioners1 8 and there apparently was marginal need for regulation,
given limited use of the product and the injuries attributable to it.319 The
proceeding was initiated by NSPI, a trade association of "1750 firms
representing builders, manufacturers, and suppliers, architects, engineers,
public officials and others allied with the swimming pool" industry and by
Aqua Slide and Dive (Aqua), which as the producer of ninety-five percent
of slides "had a substantial interest.'' 32 Several consumers helped develop
the package that the NSPI proferred to the CPSC in May.32 ' The agency
staff were concerned about, and were instructed to revise, certain aspects
of the submission.32 Moreover, the Commissioners hired a consultant to
supply economic data which were believed necessary.23 In September, the
CPSC published a proposal that changed the NSPI's installation require-
ments to recommendations because of jurisdictional concerns. 32 That alter-
ation prompted the Project Manager for NSPI to question seriously the
effort's value in reducing injuries.325 A final rule, similar to the Institute's
submission, was issued by the Commission in January, 1976.326 Many
318. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-12. CPSC rejected two prior NSPI offers
because the offers were "inadequately responsive" to CPSC offeror regulations and NSPI
relied too substantially on extant engineering data, made insufficient provision for public
involvement, and requested too large a contribution from CPSC for administrative costs. Id.
See 39 Fed. Reg. 37,804, 37,804 (1974); cf. 1976 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note
240, at 905 (Nova University only other applicant).
319. See GAO SrTuy, supra note 32, at 23-24; Hearings on Dep't of Housing and Urban
Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1977 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Indep.
Agencies of the House Appropriations Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 13 [hereinafter
1977 House Appropriations Hearings] (statement of CPSC Chairman Simpson) (1976); Hearings
on Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1977 Before the
Subcomm. on HUD-Indep. Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Comm., 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 3, 13 [hereinafter 1977 Senate Appropriations Hearings] (statement of Linda Hudek)
(1976). But cf. id.; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 50-51 n.125-26 and accompanying text (Com-
missioners believed CPSA mandated proceeding's initiation). See Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp.
v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 835-38 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussion of the proceeding's background);
OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-10 to D-19 (same); 40 Fed. Reg. 42,562, 42,562-63 (1975)
(same).
320. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-12 (NSPI's description); Aqua Slide 'N'
Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 835-36 (5th Cir. 1978) (proceeding's initiation and Aqua's
description).
321. See Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp., 569 F.2d at 836 (descriptions of the committee's
composition and the structure of its working organization); OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at
D-12 to D-14 (same); OPPE REPORT, supra at D-15, D-16 (list of NSPI's "achievements" and
a summary of its recommendations by hazard area).
322. See infra notes 329, 332 and accompanying text. But cf. infra notes 326, 332-33 and
accompanying text (NSPI submission responsive to NOP and CPSC staff modified little and
final rule included most recommendations).
323. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-15-16.
324. See 40 Fed. Reg. 42,562, 42,572 (1975). See generally OPPE REPORT, supra note 31,
at 3-9 to 3-10; D-18 to D-19.
325. OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-10.
326. See 41 Fed. Reg. 2742, (1975). "The final standard... was essentially the same as
the proposed standard." OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 6-1.
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familiar with the pool slides initiative find this the "least productive agency
proceeding: " -27 it was long and diverted scarce CPSC resources while the
standard may have lacked technical substantiation and was partially over-
turned in court.
28
Analyses of the NSPI's work were checkered. A Commissioner said
that the offeror's proposal resembled a voluntary standard that previously
had been rejected, thus necessitating significant revision. 29 Moreover, a
consultant did have to be retained. One staffer for the CPSC was "not
very impressed" with the technical competence displayed by NSPI.330 A
second agency employee found that the proposed standard development
effort was run poorly-especially in terms of the choice of citizens-and
was dominated by industry, yielding requirements favorable to Aqua Slide
and Dive.33" '
Those Commission staffers who reviewed NSPI's submission "raised
serious doubts concerning" the technical validity and the enforcement
potential of the proposal but said that it responded to the NOP, addressed
indicated hazards and defects in voluntary standards, and included a tech-
nical rationale and necessary economic data.3 2 Moreover, these evaluators
minimally altered the offeror's document.
3 3
An agency doctor thought that the NSPI "did as well as possible,"
given the difficulties inherent in quickly identifying and solving the problem
and recent creation of the CPSC and the offeror procedure.3 34 Another
Commission employee believed that NSPI did an "extremely good job" of
"managing the process" and of assembling qualified consumers and that
327. Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 66, at 7; 1977 Senate Appropriations
Hearings, supra note 319 at 12 (statements of Chairman Simpson). Many others have agreed.
See, e.g., 1977 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra, at 67-68 (statement of Senator Prox-
mire); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 50-52.
328. The petition was submitted in May, 1973, and the final standard was issued in
January, 1976. OPPE REPoRT, supra note 31, at D-10, D-17. CPSC paid NSPI only $14,000
to develop the standard. See id. at 4-30. But Aqua Slide 'N' Dive may have contributed as
much as $300,000. See id. Moreover, standard development "consumed untold Commission
resources." Schwartz, supra note 3, at 50. See Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d
831, 842-44 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing lack of substantiation and partial overturning); cf. 43
Fed. Reg. 58,813, 58,813 (1978) (rescission of provisions court overturned). For subsequent
history of pool slide regulation, see Schwartz, supra note 3, at 51 n.130 and accompanying
text; 9 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 491, 529-30 (1981); CPSC Reauthorization: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 121-22 (1985).
329. See Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 66, at 34; 1977 House Oversight
Hearings, supra note 34, at 251 (statements of Comm'r Pittle). See generally Dissenting
Opinion of Comm'r Pittle (Dec., 1975) (Commissioner's initial opposition to commencing
offeror proceeding).
330. TI with CPSC employee 1.
331. TI with CPSC employee 2.
332. See OPPE REPoRT, supra note 31, at D-17.
333. See id; accord notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
334. TI with CPSC employee 3.
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its engineering consultant avoided numerous pitfalls encountered in other
offeror proceedings. 35 The OPPE study echoed much of the complimentary
commentary, particularly regarding project administration by the NSPI and
its consultant's input.
3 6
The consultant's manager found that there was little nonproductive
antagonism between industry representatives and citizens, that the process
was "professional, wide open" and responsive to consumers, and that the
committee's small size and careful selection facilitated "smooth, efficient
development." 33 7 A committee member associated with manufacturing con-
curred, adding that "everything was done right, no time pressure existed,
information from everywhere" was gathered and the manager "rebuked
participants when they swayed to industry. ' 338 The Deputy Chairman of
the Human Factors and Behavioral Department of the Naval Research
Institute, who served as a staffer on the committee, said that the committee
"pretty unanimously" believed that the standard was "fair" and was the
"best" attainable from available data while he found that NSPI was "very
well organized. ' 339 A citizen stated that the Project Director for the NSPI
was "very valuable," explaining data so that all involved understood the
information, and that the offeror's leadership and the committee's "struc-
ture, membership selection and size" enabled consumers to be effective.
34
0
Extra-agency evaluations were mixed. Senator Proxmire found NSPI's
solution so obvious that any school child could have duplicated it in an
hour.3 4' Professor Schwartz, in denominating this initiative the "pool slide
fiasco,13 42 apparently considered it one of the least successful proceedings.
3 43
But the ACUS consultant added that swimming pool slides often are cited
"as an example of Commission failure,'' 344 which seems to be her principal
focus of concern.
Many observers of the initiative find that the CPSC was responsible
for much perceived inadequacy in NSPI's work. Because the agency supplied
insufficient injury data, the NSPI had to undertake additional testing but
could not determine the precise cause of human injuries, so that its sub-
mission included requirements "supported by technical judgments instead
of injury or laboratory data." 345 Several Commissioners admitted that the
335. TI with CPSC employee 4.
336. See OPPE REPoRT, supra note 31, at D-15 to 17.
337. TI with Robert Weiner.
338. TI with industry representative I.
339. TI with T.E. Berghage.
340. TI with funded participant I.
341. See 1977 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 319, at 67-68.
342. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 49.
343. See id. at 49-52.
344. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 51.
345. GAO SrUDY, supra note 32, at 11, 24. This necessitated an additional CPSC study.
Id. at 11. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 65 (CPSC required NSPI to treat a "number of
hazards for which it had insufficient data on how product-related injuries had occurred").
But cf. GAO STUDY, supra at 42 (CPSC supplied NSPI some accident reports and intended
that NSPI determine causality by applying its expertise).
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CPSC may have defined the project too broadly and might have provided
inadequate guidance.3 46 Moreover, the Commissioners allegedly made last-
minute changes in the final regulation and deleted requirements agreed on
by the NSPI and agency staff without notifying the Institute 47 NSPI also
was hampered because it was working at the edge of state-of-the-art 34 and
with an industry dominated by one producer.3 49 Furthermore, the rule
adopted by the Commission did include most of the offeror's recommen-
dations. 50 In short, the NSPI performed rather well, given the constraints.
The CPSC has praised the work of citizens. A Chairman made com-
plimentary comments about public activity, describing the proceeding as a
"conscientious effort.' '351 One employee found that the consumers were an
"extremely good group, some of whom were specialized or had long
experience running pools," and that a few were "quite articulate about"
slide hazards. 52 A physician said that citizens were less helpful in providing
technical input than in securing "consumer reaction to options," in esti-
mating consumer acceptability or in expediting the process.353 A third staffer
believed that public "participation was very good," because all coopera-
ted,3 54 but a fourth employee thought that those "selected had no particular
advocacy skills or ideas to contribute and were swamped.
' 355
The manager for NSPI's consultant was enthusiastic about consumer
input, mentioning a pool owner "who asked the right questions" and
346. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 58, 66 (statements of Comm'r Franklin,
Chairman Byington); accord Schwartz, supra note 3, at 65 n.229 and accompanying text. But
cf. 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 272 (statement of Comm'r Pittle) (CPSC
guidance increased with each offeror proceeding); GAO STruDY, supra note 32, at 42 (CPSC
belief that NSPI expertise and creativity could be inhibited by active CPSC direction).
347. See TIs with CPSC employees 1, 2, supra notes 330-31; OPPE REPORT, supra note
31, at 3-9 to 10, D-18 to 19. NSPI initially learned about the two principal areas-jurisdiction
and labels-of Commissioner concern when CPSC's proposal was published. See OPPE
REPORT, supra note 31, at D-18. The OPPE REPORT and CPSC employees indicate that the
jurisdiction question surfaced at the last minute because of an inadvertent oversight, but some
modifications in NSPI's submission resulted from unwarranted Commissioner "tinkering,"
especially with labeling and warning requirements assembled by NSPI and CPSC staff. Cf.
Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 840-43 (5th Cir. 1978) (sign requirements'
invalidation).
348. Two complex problems were identifying precisely how, as a biomechanical matter,
serious injuries occurred and how, as a technological and "human factors" matter, they could
be remedied most effectively. See TIs with CPSC employees 1, 3, supra notes 330, 334.
349. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
351. See 1977 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 319, at 68 (statement of
Chairman Simpson).
352. TI with CPSC employee 2, supra note 331. The individual added that NSPI developed
a "better product than ASTM" partly because "votes only were taken on proposals the
consultant assembled." Id. But cf. TI with CPSC employee 1, supra note 330 (ASTM/NCL
"consumer caucus far superior" to pool slides consumers).
353. TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 334.
354. TI with CPSC employee 4, supra note 335.
355. TI with CPSC employee 5.
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refused to accept anyone's response unless she understood it.156 The Tech-
nical Director for NSPI said that citizens afforded an "excellent third
view," asked "embarrassing questions worth answering," and "infiltrated
all activity, offering perspectives not clouded by technical bias," thereby
successfully urging the rejection on practical grounds of unwarranted tech-
nical requirements proposed by technical experts.117 The Naval Institute
employee found that all of the consumers "had some association with
pools" and "were helpful in working through the process," while a "doctor
provided good information on slide injuries, water depth and forces" and
a "YMCA representative offered data on the controversial issue of water




In June, 1975, the CPSC chose Underwriters Laboratories (UL), a
"voluntary standards development group that conducts public safety test-
ing," 36° to write requirements for risks associated with television receivers
(TVR). '1  The need for regulation was debatable, given available injury
data362 and the potential for voluntary compliance. 36 UL had great difficulty
retaining citizens, especially "use and technically oriented consumers," who
were paid only out-of-pocket expenses.36 But many individuals, who com-
prised one-third of the working group,365 helped UL to formulate recom-
mendations which required four drafts, using a consensus approach.3 6 The
suggestions, that included a technical rationale and a cost-benefit analysis,
were tendered to the agency in July, 1976.367 Initial evaluation by the CPSC
revealed the need for additional public input before a proposal could be
356. See Weiner TI, supra note 337.
357. TI with Larry Paulick.
358. Berghage TI, supra note 339.
359. TI with funded participant 1, supra note 340.
360. See Hoffman & Farr, Television Receivers: The UL Experience, ASTM STANDAR-
IZATION Naws 20, (May 1977); cf. 1976 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 240, at
906 (George Washington University also an applicant).
361. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,043, 24,043-44 (1975).
362. See H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 75, at 820 (UL statement); Oct. 1977 Senate
Oversight Hearings, supra note 184, at 62 (statement of Philip Knox); Comment, The Consumer
Product Safety Commission: In Search of a Regulatory Pattern, 12 CoLUM. J. L. & Soc.
Pgons. 393, 437-40 (1976).
363. See Comment, supra note 362, at 439. The OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at D-44,
included no case study for television receivers. Cf. 40 Fed. Reg. 8,592, 8,593-94 (1975);
Hoffman & Farr, supra note 360 (discussions of proceeding's background and of consumer
participation by UL's project manager and participation's coordinator).
364. See Hoffman & Farr, supra note 360, at 20-21.
365. See id. at 21, 24; Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1414-16.
366. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,043, 23,044 (1975) (discussion of the effort's organization and
work); Hoffman & Farr, supra note 360 (same).
367. See 41 Fed. Reg. 51,055, 51,056 (1976).
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issued.6 Moreover, in early 1977, the agency claimed that UL had "pro-
vided many specifications for components and design criteria," rather than
a performance-oriented standard, as expected.3 69 But, during October, 1977,
the Commissioners reviewed the public comments solicited earlier, certain
improvements in voluntary requirements governing television receivers, and
data indicating that product-related injuries had decreased.3 70 Finally, in
November, the Commissioners terminated consideration of mandatory con-
trols for the principal hazards thought to be posed by television receivers,
finding that voluntary standards adopted by UL and followed by industry
were being "progressively upgraded" and that there had been an "apparent
decline in TV safety-related incident data."3
a7'
Opinions of the work performed by UL were widely divergent. The
Commissioners were not very satisfied. When UL seemed to be departing
from CPSC's original guidance and appeared unresponsive to subsequent
agency importuning,37 the offeror was summoned to a Commissioners'
meeting at which the offeror was informed that it was proceeding improp-
erly.373 Although UL agreed to comply with the instructions given, its
submission still did not conform to the expectations of the CPSC.374 One
agency Chairman said that deficiencies in UL's package required CPSC to
solicit additional public input,3 s while a Commissioner attributed this need
to the "voluminous" nature of the "material which was little more than a
collection of standards previously developed."3 76 But another Chairman and
a second Commissioner admitted that the product was complex and una-
menable to compulsory controls, 377 and the latter officer and an additional
368. See id. at 51,055; 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 112-114
(statements of Chairman Byington and Comnim'rs Kushner, Pittle and Franklin).
369. See [1975-77 Transfer Binder] Cons. Prod. Safety Guide (CCH) 43,348, AT 43,348.
See generally 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 353 (statement of Professor
Hamilton).
370. See 42 Fed. Reg. 57,335, 57,336 (1977).
371. See 42 Fed. Reg. 57,335, 57,336 (1977). Consideration of mandatory requirements
for mechanical, shock and explosion hazards was terminated and consideration of fire hazards
was extended to April, 1979. Id.; cf. 44 Fed. Reg. 44,206, 44,208 (1979) (termination of
consideration of fire hazards). In 1979, Chairman King said that industry compliance with
UL's voluntary standard may have been the "reason for a substantial decrease in fires caused
by televisions." 1980 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 72, at 16; accord H.R. 2271
Hearings, supra note 75, at 821 (statement of UL).
372. See OPPE STuDy, supra note 31, at 43; 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra
note 159, at 115-16; 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 285; Apr. 1977 Senate
Oversight Hearings, supra note 78, at 127 (statements of Comm'r Pittle).
373. See 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 113 (statement of
Comm'r Pittle).
374. Id. at 112-14.
375. See id. (statement of Chairman Byington).
376. See id. (statement of Comm'r Pittle).
377. See 1977 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 319, at 27 (statement of
Chairman Simpson); 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 128 (statement
of Comm'r Franklin).
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Commissioner said that the CPSC may have provided inadequate guidance,
particularly initially.
18
Agency staff were less critical and even complimentary. One employee
found that "UL did a superior job," improving voluntary standards and
securing industry compliance, ascertaining from injury severity and fre-
quency that television receivers did not pose "unreasonable risk," and
persuading the Commissioners that mandatory requirements were unneces-
sary. 379 A second staff member thought that the "drafting process was
good" and that "UL served as a catalyst" by not waiting for CPSC to
act, by upgrading its existing standard with "ninety percent of the require-
ments proposed" and by convincing the Commissioners to reject compulsory
controls.38 0 A third employee believed that "UL did a more decent job than
some offerors but was industry oriented" and selected citizens who lacked
advocacy skills or technical expertise
8.3 1
A doctor and an attorney who participated actively in several agency
proceedings said that television receivers was a "fiasco," primarily because
UL agreed to defer to CPSC's decision that the product presented unrea-
sonable risk but challenged that determination, once selected as the of-
feror.38 2 UL asserted that "ninety-seven percent of the'mandatory'
requirements" adopted during proposed standard development were included
in its standard with which industry complied; that injuries attributable to
television receivers have plummeted; and that consumers have "reasonable
safety [with] minimum regulatory expense and irritation.
'383
But UL and many others have indicated that the CPSC may be
responsible for perceived deficiencies in the offeror's endeavors. The agen-
cy's original risk assessment and concomitant determination that mandatory
controls were necessary might have been inaccurate,3n and CPSC may have
furnished insufficient initial guidance.385 Commission incident data also
complicated work. Television receivers were said to be improperly blamed
for many accidents, so that "committee members had to decide" which
378. See 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 113-14 (statements of
Comm'rs Kushner and Franklin).
379. TI with CPSC employee 1. The individual added that UL "taught him a lot as a
young CPSC manager, especially about playing fast and loose with data." Id.
380. TI with CPSC employee 2.
381. TI with CPSC employee 3.
382. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 23 (statement of Robert Goldstone); S.644
Hearings, supra note 77, at 92 (statement of David Swankin).
383. See H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 75, at 820-21 (UL statement); TI with CPSC
employee 2, supra note 380.
384. See supra note 362 and accompanying text; S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 153
(statement of Baron Whitaker). But cf. 1980 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 72,
at 16 (statement of Chairman King); 1979 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 160, at
46 (statement of Michael Brown) (CPSC initiation of proceeding prompted industry voluntary
standard work).
385. See supra note 378 and accompanying text.
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data were germane and what "problems would be approached, and how."3 6
There was as well too little time for proposed standard development; indeed,
UL was granted an extension, due to expanding "need for extensive testing
and evaluation, late availability of much subpoenaed data and time needed
to analyze it, and increasing standard complexity. ' 3 7 In short, UL's work
seemed respectable in light of the limitations.
CPSC assessments of citizens were positive. One official said that they
made "substantial contributions," especially affording the "new dimension
of end users saying that mandatory standards were unnecessary" and that
UL's approach was more cost effective. 38 A Commission lawyer found that
many individuals were "helpful and knowledgeable, ' 389 while a technical
expert believed that several electrical engineering professors were "quite
valuable in key areas. ' '390
The Project Manager for UL said consumers voted to inform the agency
that television receivers posed no unreasonable risk and that mandatory
controls were unnecessary, input which influenced the final decision of the
CPSC. 391 The Project Manager observed that technical citizens "served as
a balance to manufacturers." ' 392 "Use-oriented consumers [related] experi-
ences with, or opinions about, [product hazards] and use and care instruc-
tions," while explaining "how consumers actually use TVs." 393 Some lay
participants made "many contributions to the technical discussions" but
others "felt unable to vote on certain technical issues." 394 In sum, the
official found that each individual "had a unique place," that they provided
balance which "was of utmost importance," and that citizen activity was
"excellent." 39
6. Miniature Christmas Tree Lights
In June, 1977, NCL, a nonprofit consumer advocacy organization, was
selected by the CPSC to developed requirements for hazards the agency
believed were associated with miniature Christmas tree lights (MCTL).
396
386. Hoffman & Farr, supra note 360, at 21; accord Comment, supra note 362, at 438-
39.
387. See GAO STuDY, supra note 32, at 41; 1977 House Appropriations Hearings, supra
note 319, at 27 (statement of Chairman Simpson); 40 Fed. Reg. 51,222, 51,223 (1975).
388. TI with CPSC employee 2, supra note 380.
389. TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 381.
390. TI with CPSC employee 4.
391. See TI with David Hoffman, UL project manager for TVRs.
392. See Hoffman & Farr, supra note 360, at 23.
393. Id. at 24.
394. Id. The latter lacked technical experience. Id. Cf. TIs with CPSC employees 1, 2,
supra notes 380-81 (speculation that lay consumers could become confused or could become
dependent on others when considering complex technical issues).
395. See Hoffman & Farr, supra note 360, at 21-22, 24.
396. See 42 Fed. Reg. 33,359, 33,361 (1977); cf. Note, supra note 27, at 1177 n.26 (NCL
description); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 66-88 (summary of proceeding); 43 Fed. Reg. 19, 136-
37 (1978) (discussion of proceeding's background). There is no MCTL case study because the
OPPE REPORT issued before the MCTLs proceeding was completed.
1987]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
The necessity for regulation apparently was questionable, given the potential
for voluntary compliance3 97 as well as the small risk posed by, and the
number of injuries attributable to, the product. 38 This was the last offeror
initiative, and CPSC drew upon prior experience and recommendations of
the OPPE and of the NCL to revise substantially the agency's role: "The
Commission limited the hazards ... to the two most serious ones [The
NOP] [1] included an extensive discussion of the strengths and weaknesses
of existing standards [and] [2] announced the availability of [data] responsive
to the notice [and of CPSC funding for] consumer participants. . .. "I"
Numerous citizens, including several "well-trained consumer advocates,"
were paid to participate. 400 They formed a caucus for putposes of commu-
nication and reinforcement, and the caucus had access to engineers, econ-
omists and behavioral scientists as well as laboratory facilities, so that
proposals aired during proposed standard development could be assessed. 
4 '
In November, NCL proffered its suggestions to the Commission. 40 2 The
CPSC staff analyzed the recommendations, conducted more tests to ascertain
the efficacy of some restrictions in addressing hazards, 403 and prepared
labeling because only general directions were provided by the offeror. 404 The
Commissioners then reviewed NCL's submission, decided that some modi-
fications in it and certain additional requirements were needed, made the
requisite changes and issued a proposal in May, 1978. 40 Thereafter, major
397. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 149 (statement of Aaron Locker); 1978
Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 85, at 1702-03 (statement of Senator Proxmire).
But cf. id. (statement of Chairman Byington) (CPSC commenced proceeding because voluntary
compliance inadequate, ad hoc enforcement inefficient, lawsuit); accord as to second, 1979
House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 160, at 466 (statements of Comm'rs Franklin,
Pittle).
398. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 149 (statement of Aaron Locker); 1978
Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 85, at 1702-03 (statement of Senator Proxmire);
infra note 429.
399. S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 200-02 (statement of Chairman Byington); accord
1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 251, 263-64 (statements of Conun'r Pittle,
David Swankin); Apr. 1977 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 78, at 126 (statement of
Comm'r Kushner).
400. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 263 (statement of David
Swankin).
401. See id.; S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 201 (statement of Chairman Byington);
cf. id. at 200-03; 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 263-65 (discussions of
work's organization and consumer activity).
402. See 42 Fed. Reg. 19,136, 19,137 (1977) (discussion of suggestions).
403. Id. at 19,137; accord TI with CPSC employee 1. One concern was a sophisticated,
but unrefined, methodology developed by NCL which was recognized as needing more work
when submitted. See 1979 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 160 at 465-67 (statements
of Chairman Byington, Comm'rs Franklin & Pittle); cf. id. at 466 (statement of Comm'r
Franklin) (delay was fault of offeror process not of NCL).
404. See 1979 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 135, at 262 (statement of
Chairman Byington); 43 Fed. Reg. 19,136, 19,137 (1978).
405. See 43 Fed. Reg. 19,136, 19,137 (1978) (discussion of changes); Hamilton, supra




industry groups-UL, representing domestic producers, and the National
Ornament and Electric Lights Association (NOEL), representing importing
interests-upgraded voluntary standards to satisfy strictures in the agency
proposal.4 The CPSC terminated the initiative, once persuaded that indus-
try would comply.4 7 Thus, although the miniature Christmas tree lights
initiative was touted as the most successful proceeding, its outcome was
similar to the television receivers matter.403
CPSC personnel generally found NCL to be quite competent. A Chair-
man said that its submission "was probably the most all-inclusive" standard
tendered by any offeror and that proposed standard development had been
much less costly and resource-intensive than if done in-house; that NCL's
"experience and managerial skill [and] astute examination" of past weak-
nesses led to "highly effective management [and] an outstanding effort;"
and that the offeror assured that all views were considered fully and that
agency staff actively were involved the entire time, defending their ideas
"in an open forum consisting of industry, consumers and experts." The
Chairman did admit, however, that the manager of NCL's endeavor under-
stood the process and that the product was relatively simple, so that
cumulative experience and existing standards facilitated work.
4 10
A Commissioner found that NCL's submission was "one of the finest,"
including several "state-of-the-art provisions" and some novel ones which
were "completely justified. '411 But the official observed that the CPSC
revised the offeror process and its role; the agency provided more "front-
end" analysis, especially by narrowing the "number and scope of hazards,"
greater data on solutions, expanded citizen funding and enhanced staff
participation. 4 2 Moreover, the official claimed that Commission staff spent
much time working on NCL's suggestions 413 and that the proceeding still
406. See 46 Fed. Reg. 17,788, 17,789 (1981); H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 75, at 339
(statement of Acting Chairman Statler); 1980 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 72,
at 16, 57-58 (statement of Chairman King); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 67 n.245 and accom-
panying text.
407. See, e.g., S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 200-02 (statement of Chairman
Byington); 1979 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 3, at 66-68; cf. supra note 399
and accompanying text (reasons why MCTL proceeding successful).
408. See 46 Fed. Reg. 45,940, 45,941 (1981); supra note 371 and accompanying text. See
generally National Ornament & Elec. Lights Ass'n. v. CPSC, 526 F.2d 1368, 1373 (2d Cir.
1975) (judicial rejection of challenge to CPSC information campaign on MCTLS).
409. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 200-02 (statement of Chairman Byington).
But cf. TI with CPSC employee 1, supra note 403 (standard development consumed "more
staff time than if developed in-house").
410. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 200-08 (statement of Chairman Byington).
411. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 67; 1979 House Appropriations
Hearings, supra note 160, and 467 (statements of Commissioner Pittle).
412. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 67; 1979 House Appropriations
Hearings, supra note 160, at 467 (statements of Commissioner Pittle).
413. See 1979 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 160, at 467; 1977 House
Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 251; H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 61.
19871
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
was lengthy. 414 The Commissioner added that the initiative was "quite
unique"-MCTLs were simple, posing easily remedied risks; intra-industry
competition meant that issues were "clearly defined and technically sup-
ported;" the manager for the NCL had years of experience; 415 and the
CPSC did so much initial research that it could have completed the work
more expeditiously. 4 6 Two other Commissioners waxed eloquent in Congres-
sional testimony about the enhanced quality of standard development in
this proceeding but the officials were speaking less to the efforts of NCL,
than to CPSC improvements. 41
7
Agency staff were less positive. One employee found that standard
development was more "administratively successful" and was characterized
by "hot and heavy debate and healthy exchanges, '418 while a second staffer
thought that the MSTL proceeding was "one of the better initiatives. '419
Another employee said that the NCL "did the best job" possible, given the
new procedure, but that some material the offeror tendered was revised and
that the project could have been finished more quickly in-house. 420 A fourth
staff member believed that NCL organized citizens well, "helping them
articulate their views and not letting them be pushed around," but prepared
recommendations that were too complex and hired consultants who seemed
unable to draft effective requirements. 421
The manager for the NCL claimed that this was the "most successful
proceeding," describing proposed standard development as "quick, efficient,
supported and open-ended." 422 Moreover, the offeror instituted a novel,
two-tiered standard writing system, joining "technical and scientific models
of peer review with legal principles of appellate review," whereby the review
panel attended technical meetings to "understand what their decisionmaking
was about." ' 42s The manager added that NCL organized the citizens into a
caucus and provided them testing facilities; 424 promoted "real interchange"
among the caucus, industry representatives and CPSC; maximized the
414. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 67; 1979 House Appropriations
Hearings, supra note 160, at 467.
415. See H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 61; 1977 House Oversight Hearings,
supra note 34, at 252.
416. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 252.
417. See, e.g., Apr. 1977 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 78, at 126 (statement of
Comm'r Kushner); 1979 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 160, at 466; H.R. 10,819
Hearings, supra note 248 at 58 (statements of Comm'r Franklin).
418. TI with CPSC employee 1, supra note 403.
419. TI with CPSC employee 2.
420. TI with CPSC employee 3.
421. TI with CPSC employee 4.
422. See Swankin TIs, supra notes 272, 273. The individual added that if all of the
proceedings had functioned as smoothly as this one, the procedure might still be in use.
Swankin TI I, supra note 272.
423. See Swankin Tis, supra notes 272, 273.




perspectives expressed and their consideration in decisionmaking; encouraged
agency staff involvement, thus expediting later Commission review; and
facilitated work by dismissing irrelevant questions.
425
The Executive Vice-President of the NCL said that the offeror "spared
a lot of ill will" and saved the CPSC much time, umpiring "industry
squabbling" and affording expert technical help as well as a forum where
"importers, U.L., retailers, and everyone who wanted" could participate,
the problems of small and large firms, importers and testing laboratories
might be aired and documented, and minority ideas could be registered so
"all thought they had fair hearings. '426 NCL also brought "divergent
viewpoints in before the fact" and gave CPSC a "variety of recommen-
dations [and a] complete record," which was documented thoroughly, so
that the Commission could make an "informed choice between alterna-
tives. ''427
A lawyer for the NOEL stated that there already were "two existing
voluntary standards" so that the NCL could "develop an amalgam. ' 428
Although producers generally felt that they were listened to and that many
decisions made during the proposed standard development process were
sound and in consumers' interest, 429 industry opposed mandatory controls
as unnecessary.430 Nevertheless, manfacturers were able to quantify the safety
of miniature Christmas tree lights and to develop a standard that was
acceptable to the "most critical engineers" at the National Bureau of
Standards (NBS) in eight months.
431
Outside evaluators find that miniature Christmas tree lights was one of
the most productive offeror proceedings but not due exclusively to the
efforts of the NCL. Professor Schwartz thought that the proposed standard
development stage was successful because NCL possessed experience that it
had gleaned from participating in the matchbooks initiative and had a
"skilled manager who worked well with diverse interest groups and hired
consultants with strong technical expertise. ' 432 Nonetheless, she also ascribed
success to improved CPSC procedures; the simple nature of the product;
extant voluntary requirements that were a good starting point; and the
interests of manufacturers who were "motivated to find" a voluntary
solution.433 Professor Hamilton believed that the proposed standard devel-
opment effort was more successful in that the draft tendered by the offeror
425. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 260-68, 272, 287.
426. See 1981 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 180, at 81; H.R. 2271 Hearings,
supra note 75, at 80 (statements of Sandra Willett).
427. See 1981 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 180, at 81.
428. TI with Aaron Locker.
429. The lawyer claimed "there were 17 incidents associated with the product in the year
prior to commencement of the proceeding." Id.
430. H.R. 10,819 Hearings, supra note 248, at 149.
431. Locker TI, supra note 428.
432. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 67.
433. See id.; at 67-68.
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was closer to agency views of what was appropriate but the evaluator
ascribed the perceived "improvement" principally to initial CPSC work,
while observing that NCL'ssubmission still had to be revised.434 One citizen
who had been involved in other agency initiatives said that the NCL
"produced a reasonable standard on schedule" because the offeror was
"dedicated to making the process work," never disputing the Commission's
original unreasonable risk determination, and because the CPSC provided
guidance, consumer funding and technical assistance.4"1 A second member
of the public found that this effort was more efficient because agency "staff
were intimately involved," answering questions throughout proposed stand-
ard development.
436
Appraisals of citizens were less complimentary. A Chairman considered
them "outstandingly qualified, interested and dependable," describing their
input as "consistent, well-documented, intensive and material to the stand-
ard's outcome. '437 The Program Manager for the CPSC thought that a
"lot of effort went into getting consumers up to speed," but that they
"added nothing new. ' 438 A second staffer found that citizens "made points
effectively and supported them, '439 while a third employee believed that
they had "pretty good labeling suggestions" but offered little on very
technical issues." 0
The manager for the NCL said that consumers "created new end product
testing" and even joined "industry to fight staff when it second guessed
technical aspects" of the offeror's submission. 1 An NCL officer thought
that citizens mastered "technical aspects of the subject" and made "sub-
stantial contributions to a traditionally narrow field," forcing industry to
explain technical factors." 2 One consultant for the NCL claimed that several
recalcitrant consumers could have "wrecked the project" but proved helpful
once they were "confronted by engineers and asked to cooperate."" 3 The
attorney for the NOEL believed that those who contributed most worked
for UL or industry and that lay consumers could not appreciate technical
issues implicated "in developing electrical standards." 4 A doctor added
that participant funding enabled citizens to be effective."5
434. See Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1415-16.
435. TI with funded participant 1.
436. TI with funded participant 2.
437. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 200-08 (statement of Chairman Byington).
438. TI with CPSC employee 2, supra note 419.
439. See TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 420.
440. See TI with CPSC employee 4, supra note 421.
441. Swankin TI, supra note 272.
442. See 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 343 (statement of Sandra
Willett).
443. Weiner TI, supra note 337.
444. See Locker TI, supra note 428.
445. See S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 29, 33 (statement of Robert Goldstone).
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7. Public Playground Equipment
In August, 1975, the National Recreation and Parks Association (NRPA)
was chosen by the CPSC to develop standards for public playground
equipment. There apparently was questionable need for mandatory con-
trols, given the source of most injuries ascribed to the equipment and the
difficulties entailed in treating them with compulsory requirements. 47 CPSC
informed NRPA shortly after the offeror was selected that the agency
probably lacked "jurisdiction over" surfaces underlying public playground
equipment. 44 The NRPA, a "non-profit, public interest, research and
educational organization" had worked on "somewhat technical standards
for recreational facilities" but had been only a commentator on earlier
industry efforts to formulate voluntary requirements. 449 Moreover, NRPA
was chosen despite reservations expressed by several CPSC bureaus about
the offeror's abilities, concerns which neither were resolved by proposed
standard development's inception nor communicated to NRPA.40 Many
citizens assisted the NRPA, while five were on the development committee.451
The offeror experienced difficulties in commencing and managing the process
and met with agency staff about the problems.452 The Commissioners told
the offeror that it was proceeding incorrectly and threatened to terminate
NRPA but permitted the offeror to continue work which it completed in
May, 1976. 413 However, some difficulties anticipated by CPSC apparently
materialized because it found that NRPA's technical rationale and test
methods posed problems and the agency had to ask the NBS to undertake
446. See 40 Fed. Reg. 10,706, 10,707 (1975); ef. id. at 10,706-07 (discussion of decision
not to rely upon CPSA but rather Federal Hazardous Substances Act and "offeror-like"
procedures). See 40 Fed. Reg. 33,703, 33,704 (1975) (relating to NRPA's selection); cf. OPPE
REPORT, supra note 31, at D-40 (Unimat Industries, a producer, also was an applicant); id.
at D-40 to D-43; 40 Fed. Reg. 10,706, 10,706-09 (1975); 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,352-53 (1979)
(discussion of proceeding's background).
447. See infra notes 457, 459, 484-85 and accompanying text.
448. See OPPE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 3-10.
449. See id. at D-40 to D-41.
450. See id. at D-41 to D-42, 4-12. One bureau "found NRPA's offer marginally
acceptable" and requested more procedural specificity; a second bureau "had many reservations
and conditions of acceptance," finding the offer insufficiently specific about technical and
management experience, work descriptions, responsibility for execution and test development
and procedures; and a third bureau expressed "concern that the development schedule was
too crowded" and "found the technical plan unacceptable" because it inadequately discussed
procedures, personnel and working groups' operation. Id. at D-41 to D-42.
451. See 40 Fed. Reg. 33,703, 33,703 (1975); cf. id. at 33,703-04; OPPE REPoRT, supra
note 31, at D-43 to 43 (discussion of committee composition and work's organization).
452. See OPPE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 5-6 to 5-7.
453. See 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 116 (relating to
threatening termination); 1977 Oversight Hearings, supra note 79, at 286 (statements of Commn'r
Pittle) (same); OPPE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 5-7 (December, 1975, CPSC determination of
inadequate offeror performance); 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,353 (1979) (relating to work's
completion).
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"technical work needed to revise" the offeror's submission.454 The CPSC
then held several public meetings in which it funded a "consumer long
active in" the field of public playground equipment and injuries to chil-
dren.455 In early 1979, NBS completed three reports which included safety




The CPSC then concluded that "what could be mandated [legally] was
being done. ' 4 7 In October, 1979, the Commissioners announced that they
would publish the NBS documents as guidance for producers, buyers and
the public48 because compulsory controls alone could not treat adequately
public playground equipment injuries, especially the large number attribut-
able to surfaces underlying the equipment. 459 The agency solicited public
comment on the substance of the NBS reports and on the advisability of
issuing them as guidelines, paying seven entities to offer their viewpoints.
46
The CPSC used the input received to revise the NBS documents and
published them as guidelines, 461 thus eschewing mandatory controls, the
attempted development of which had cost 800,000 dollars.4 2 Unsuccessful
suit challenging issuance of the reports as guidelines ended one of the most
frustrating initiatives,43 an endeavor which ironically may have improved
the safety of public playground equipment. 464
Many have criticized the efforts of the NRPA. One staffer for the
CPSC found that NRPA was "consistently confused," that its proposed
454. See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,353 (1979); cf. OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4-13
(bureau concerns seemed to become realities).
455. See 1979 Senate Appropriations Hearings, supra note 135, at 264. The consumer had
been involved in the proposed standard development phase.
456. See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,352-53 (1979); cf. id. at 57,353-54 (discussion of reports).
457. TI with CPSC employee 1.
458. See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,353 (1979).
459. See id. at 57,352-53. Many have identified surfaces onto which children fall as an
important source of playground injuries. See, e.g., TI with CPSC employee 1, supra note 457;
TI with CPSC employee 2; TIs with funded participants 1, 2; TI with Robert Beuchner,
NRPA Project Director. Cf. S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at 53 (Office of General Counsel
opinion that CPSC could require negative surfaces labeling).
460. See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,353-55 (1979). The seven included NRPA and funded
participant 2, supra note 459.
461. See 1982 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 143, at 837 (statement of Acting
Chairman Statler); cf. H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 75, at 837-72 (reprinted reports).
462. From fiscal 1975 to 1979, CPSC "spent $832,000 to develop a mandatory safety
standard for public playground equipment." 1982 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note
143, at 837 (statement of Acting Chairman Statler).
463. See Howell Playground Equipment Co. v. CPSC, No. 91-2071, Slip op. (7th Cir.,
Apr. 10, 1981) (plaintiffs' contention that issuance of reports as guidance would deprive them
of liberty or property was rejected); cf. TI with CPSC employee 3; OPPE REPORT, supra note
31, at 3-10 to 3-11 (frustration).
464. See TI with CPSC employee 2, supra note 459 ("No one makes public playground
equipment without following the guidelines"); cf. Hearings on Dep't of Housing and Urban
Dev.-Indep. Agencies Appropriations for 1984 Before the Subcomm. for HUD-Indep.
Agencies of the House Appropriations Comm., 98th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, 59 (1983)
[hereinafter 1984 House Appropriations Hearings] (CPSC assertion that handbooks apparently
contributed to improved playground safety).
[Vol. 44:409
INSTRUCTIVE PRECURSOR
standard development consumed the most time, and that its "work was the
most marginal." 465 Another agency employee said that "what emerged were
totally unworkable untested ideas which failed to address real injury pos-
sibilities," ascribing these phenomena to NRPA's lack of technical profi-
ciency, industry and consumer recalcitrance, and CPSC deficiencies.4 A
third staff member stated that the "initial submission was revised almost
one hundred percent;" the offeror's proposal included many technical
requirements, especially numerical limitations, which were not substantiated,
"well developed, or defined," thus necessitating NBS testing to identify
"justifiable tolerance levels and to supply supporting rationales." 467 An
employee of the NBS agreed that little technical data underlie many require-
ments recommended by the NRPA so NBS "ran tests and performed
additional work to support" some of the requirements suggested and revised
others.45
Concerns about the dearth of substantiation were echoed by additional
people and entities, 469 and by the Commissioners who also questioned the
"validity, repeatability, and reproductibility" of NRPA testing.470 The NRPA
experienced difficulty commencing work and securing committee decisions
and often consulted agency staff about administrative and technical defi-
ciencies. 47' The Commissioners informed the offeror that it was proceeding
improperly; 472 threatened to terminate NRPA if it failed to expedite work;473
seriously considered terminating the offeror or having CPSC monitors
conduct meetings while instructing them to "act almost as a co-chairman;" 474
and issued a "determination of inadequate performance." 475 the NRPA
promised to follow the Commissioners' instructions when notified of per-
ceived deficiencies in its performance but disregarded these instructions,
tendering a submission which was not very helpful to the agency in treating
the risks associated with public playground equipment. 476 Even the Project
Manager for the NRPA, in compiling a list of "lessons learned," enumerated
465. TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 463. The individual also recognized "it was
an awfully ambitious effort."
466. TI with CPSC employee 2, supra note 459.
467. TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 463.
468. See TI with NBS employee 1.
469. See, e.g., TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 463; OPPE REPORT, supra note 31,
at 5-6.
470. See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,352 (1979).
471. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 5-6 to 5-7. The "meetings did not have a
strong impact because the offeror-manager expressed surprise at the Commission's determi-
nation of inadequate performance." Id. at 5-7.
472. See 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 166; 1977 House
Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 286 (statements of Comm'r Pittle).
473. See supra note 453 (listing of pertinent sources).
474. See 1978 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 159, at 116; 1977 House
Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 286 (statements of Comm'r Pittle).
475. See OPPE REPoRT, supra note 31, at 5-7.
476. 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 286 (statement of Comm'r Pittle).
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many that might have facilitated proposed standard development.4 7 An
industry employee said that the offeror "needed a standard writer and
realized that it lacked" the requisite expertise. 478 A funded citizen asserted
that NRPA was "very biased," assembling a standard development com-
mittee comprised of half as many consumers as "industry-oriented" people
so that the "bloc" created opposed imposition of any safety requirements.4 79
Some observers, however, were more positive. One trade association
representative found that the NRPA "did a pretty good job completing an
overwhelming task. ' 4 0 A Commission staffer thought the offeror "did an
extremely good job," organized and focused work, minimized adversarial
relationships, and assembled valuable data from many disciplines, such as
that on child psychology and physiology.41
Much that happened during proposed standard development may have
been beyond NRPA's control but within CPSC's power. The breadth of
the charge given the offeror might have doomed the effort from the outset.
48 2
Moreover, the tardy jurisdictional decision made by the Commission addi-
tionally complicated a complex project and alienated participants, eliminat-
ing from consideration what was later determined to be the major source
of injuries-surfaces beneath the equipment.483 The expectation that the
NRPA would develop a satisfactory mandatory solution may have been
unrealistic, in light of subsequent inability of the NBS and the CPSC to do
So
484 as well as agency admissions that many injuries could not treated with
compulsory controls. 415 NRPA was selected, although several Commission
bureaus evinced doubts about the offeror's competence, while agency staff
apparently supplied deficient data which delayed work, seemingly provided
little guidance, allegedly prejudged the outcome and even might have lost
interest once it became clear that the NRPA was having difficulty and that
no easy solution existed. 416 The NRPA had to "start from scratch," as
477. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4-13.
478. TI with industry representative I.
479. TI with funded participant I, supra note 459; S.2796 Hearings, supra note 159, at
52-55 (statement of Theodora Sweeney). The individual added that NRPA's selection meant
that the "die was already cast for the defeat of the consumer interest." Id. at 52. Moreover,
she observed that industry successfully blocked mandatory standard issuance. TI with funded
participant 1, supra note 459.
480. TI with industry representative 1.
481. TI with CPSC employee 1, supra note 457. The individual also said that the
development committee believed "something needed fixing but was unsure how to do it" and
tried to remedy everything which slowed the proposed standard development effort. Id.
482. See TI with CPSC Employee 2, supra note 459; 40 Fed. Reg. 10,706, 10,706 (1975)
(appearance in the NOP of CPSC's charge to NRPA).
483. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-10.
484. See supra notes 454, 456-59, 462 and accompanying text; cf. Beuchner TI, supra
note 459 (CPSC and NBS not much more successful); TI with CPSC employee 1, supra note
457 (NRPA undertook "awfully ambitious effort").
485. See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,352, 57,352-53 (1979).
486. See supra note 450 and accompanying text (relating to NRPA's selection); OPPE
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there were few accident studies or hazard analyses, and was required to




A number of these difficulties may have been exacerbated by citizens,
although many evaluators agreed that "taxpayers got their money's worth."
The analysts said that consumers improved safety; worked very hard;
educated themselves, learning all that was possible about the issues and
developing reasonable solutions; provided necessary balance, challenging
industry and keeping it honest; identified important questions for discussion;
afforded new, keener insights, such as reminders about the terrible nature
of children's injuries; and promoted the articulation of technical ration-
ales .41 But even the positive tone of this commentary must be qualified
because some citizens so distrusted industry that they slowed work or were
ineffective; were disconcerting or disruptive; lacked proficiency in technical
areas or the ability to provide substantiation for their perspectives or the
controls imposed; or had little effect on CPSC's ultimate decision. 489 More-
over, other evaluators believed that certain consumers were unable to
overcome biases, were so critical that they had no impact, were deliberately
obstructive, or were merely promoting personal or political interests or were
fighting among themselves for power. 4
9
0
Some of these criticisms seem applicable to the person funded to
participate in the public meetings. A Commission staffer described the
individual as a "thorn in the proceedings, who established herself as
consumer adversary" and who summarily rejected as premised on "ulterior
motives" proposals offered by industry and others. 491 An industry attorney
said that the "art of compromise was almost totally alien" to the consumer
who was so critical that the person was "totally ineffective. ' 492 Although
these assessments appear to implicate style, the CPSC adopted few of the
advocate's substantive suggestions. However, several seem valid or were
addressed: agency staff found that the consumer raised "legitimate concerns
about some" provisions in the material submitted by the NRPA but that
REPORT, supra note 31. The assertions as to staff were gleaned principally from interviewing
those familiar with the proceeding and partially from the OPPE REPoRT. See OPPE REPORT,
supra.
487. See OPPE REPORT, supra note 31 (assertions were gleaned principally from inter-
viewing those familiar with the proceeding and partially from the OPPE REPORT).
488. These assertions were gleaned from interviewing those familiar with the proceeding,
but funded participants were impressed more favorably than CPSC employees who were
impresed more favorably than industry representatives.
489. These assertions were gleaned from interviewing those familiar with the proceeding.
The degree of favorable impression observed, however, is similar here, although CPSC
employees were more critical. See supra note 488 (discussion of favorable impressions).
490. These criticisms came principally from industry representatives, but some were made
by CPSC employees. Several people whom I interviewed claimed some consumers thought that
all manufacturers were "out to kill children" while some manufacturers thought that all
consumers were "out to destroy industry."
491. See TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 463.
492. See TI with industry representative 2.
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the solutions offered "severely underestimated" cost, were "subjective" and
lacked supporting test data.4 93 Moreover, the individual contended that the
input provided caused the Commission's "general counsel to study" the
possibility of labeling and that the official adopted the views offered.
494
The funded public comments on the NBS reports generally seem to
have been better. Two agency staffers who analyzed the submissions said
that numerous ideas proferred were considered seriously and that several
recommendations strongly influenced CPSC resolution of questions at issue
or actually were included in the guidelines ultimately published. 495 A "con-
structive suggestion used in preparing the handbooks" was that "technical
data for manufacturers" appear in a section separate from that providing
practical material for consumers. 496 One agency employee thought that a
few of the compensated submissions did not significantly help the CPSC in
revising the NBS documents, but the staffer assigned "high ratings to
some," especially for "keen insights on the real world of children's play
that regulators as manipulators of magic numbers" lack. 49 A technical
expert from the NBS found that some comments were "very valid and
worth addressing" and that others were "anecdotal and not too relevant.
'498
A third Commission employee agreed, adding that "those paid the most
did not submit the best comments," 499 while a fourth agency staff member
said the input "essentially repeated earlier suggestions." '  My reading
confirms these evaluations: two reimbursed comments were uncritical; three
compensated submissions were premised more on anecdotes and personal
opinions than on data; three were extensive; and two were sophisticated.5 z0
III. CONCLUSIONS FROM CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMNISSION
EXPERIMENTATION Wrrn THE OFFEROR PROCESS
A. Specific Conclusions
1. Benefits and Disadvantages of Government Sponsored Public
Participation
Government supported nonindustry participation in the offeror initia-
tives conducted by the CPSC had numerous salutary effects throughout
493. See CPSC Memorandum from Terry Rogers to Elaine Besson (Mar. 16, 1978).
494. See TI with funded participant I, supra note 459; cf. id. (consumer developed much
valuable data). See generally CPSC Memorandum, supra note 493 (more discussion of con-
sumer's input).
495. See TI with CPSC employee 3, supra note 463; TI with CPSC employee 4.
496. See CPSC Memorandum from Terry Rogers to Elaine Besson (Dec. 18, 1980).
497. TI with CPSC employee 1, supra note 457.
498. TI with NBS employee I, supra note 468.
499. See TI with CPSC employee 5.
500. See TI with CPSC employee 2, supra note 459.
501. See comments available in CPSC files.
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proposed standard development and Commission decisional processes. 502 For
instance, reimbursed individuals and entities fashioned felicitous frameworks
for decisionmaking at the commencement of the processes and thereafter
offered novel information or new perspectives on questions already in
dispute, and many of these contributions were relied upon by decisionmakers
in resolving issues or in supporting determinations reached.5 0 3 Moreover,
the quality of compensated involvement could fairly be characterized as
respectable.5°4 For example, much of the input was accurate while most of
the ideas asserted were advocated effectively.50 5 Participant funding also
afforded a number of advantages which pertain less closely to decisionmak-
ing processes. Reimbursement promoted participation by individuals and
organizations whose interests theretofore had been underrepresented, if
championed at all; remedied an imbalance in information and views pre-
sented to those involved in proposed standard development and ultimately
to the Commission; and was rather inexpensive, especially in contrast to
other devices for securing the requisite input on which decisions are prem-
ised.
50
However, compensated participation also was inefficacious, having det-
rimental or minimal effect on decisional processes; lacked quality; and had
deleterious ramifications related less directly to decisionmaking. 5° Funded
contributions were repetitive, incorrect or unsubstantiated, which could have
the significant harmful implication of delay. Certain reimbursed people and
entities lacked the ability to articulate fairly or clearly their views, and a
few simply did not have negotiating skills. Government funding occasionally
failed to facilitate participation by individuals or groups that previously had
not been involved in decisional processes or to alter meaningfully the
imbalance in data and perspectives conveyed to decisionmakers or the
composition of participants in decisional processes.5 0 8
502. The benefits and disadvantages that follow constitute a cursory and selective, although
representative, summary of the proceeding-specific assessment in § II.B. which derives
examples from the analysis. As in that evaluation, the focus is on the proposed standard
development phase even though much said also applies to the second, intra-agency stage of
standard development.
503. There obviously are many other advantages. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § III.A.1.
(listing number of other advantages, most of which apply to the offeror proceedings); Tobias,
supra note 3, at § IV.A. (same).
504. Quality and efficacy are not completely distinct concepts. Cf. supra notes 42-43 and
accompanying text (description of both).
505. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § III.A.1. (listing other examples, most of which apply
to the offeror initiatives).
506. See id. (other benefits, most of which apply to the offeror proceedings); id. at n.357
(more discussion of relative expense in an analogous context). Indeed, so little was paid those
funded in the offeror process that the value of their input may have been jeopardized. See
notes 27-28 and accompanying text. But cf. infra note 513 and accompanying text (offeror
process costly).
507. Numerous disadvantages were essentially the opposites of the advantages.
508. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § III.A.I. (listing other disadvantages, most of which
apply to the offeror initiatives); Tobias, supra note 3, at § IV.B. (same).
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Nonetheless, most of these difficulties can be treated or at least their
worst aspects can be ameliorated. °9 But a few of the problems may not be
amenable to solution or they could be the fixed costs of an otherwise
worthwhile enterprise. 10 Perhaps most interesting was that the efficacy and
quality of compensated involvement were so respectable, given the consid-
erable constraints imposed, especially by the offeror process itself.
2. The Offeror Process and Its Implications for
Government Sponsored Public Participation
a. Benefits and Disadvantages of the Offeror Process
The offeror process afforded some advantages as a mechanism for
standard setting. For iistance, it was rather expeditious, particularly in
comparison to other techniques for developing standards."' Indeed, there
may have been a few situations in which the procedure could have been
applied effectively, although at considerable expense and no more efficiently
than had the CPSC undertaken the work. 1 2
But the offeror process also had numerous detrimental implications,
such as excessive complexity and high cost,5 13 and the device did not function
very well as a mechanism for making decisions or resolving disputes. Indeed,
there is widespread agreement among individuals and entities familiar with
the offeror process that it generally was ineffective. This view is reinforced
partly by the fact that no mandatory requirements resulted from half of
the standard development proceedings and the compulsory controls devel-
oped in the remaining initiatives were somehow undone as well as by the
ultimate demise of the procedure itself. There are numerous reasons why
the process failed to work well, for which all involved with the mechanism
bear some responsibility.
Congress created a new agency and assigned it many tasks, one of
which was to promulgate consumer product safety standards that had been
drafted in proposed form pursuant to an unprecedented administrative
procedure. 1 4 The legislative branch afforded the CPSC little guidance on
509. For instance, decisionmaker need and participant capability can be better matched.
See Tobias, supra note 3, at § IV.C. (listing other examples).
510. See id. at 951 (it is very difficult to prescribe and apply eligibility criteria for selecting
funding applicants); id. at 950-52 (listing other problems associated with compensation); Tobias,
supra note 2, at § III.A.2.-3. (discussion of funded participation's "relative and comparative
value" and a "contextual analysis of efficacy," both of which essentially are applicable to the
offeror proceedings).
511. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 95 (CPSC completion of lawn mower standard in
less than five years reasonable in comparison to time required by private standards-writing
entities).
512. See id. at 66-68.
513. See id. at 62-68, 75, 94-95.
514. See Scalia & Goodman, supra note 3 (comprehensive treatment of other tasks assigned
CPSC); Schwartz, supra note 3 (same).
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how the .novel mechanism might be implemented. But Congress imposed a
number of onerous requirements upon Commission use of the offeror
process as well as time frames for satisfaction of those requirements which
were woefully unrealistic in light of prior experience with standard devel-
opment.51 - In fact, the process prescribed by statute may have been ill-
conceived, particularly insofar as it contemplated that an extra-agency entity
could write promptly mandatory consumer product safety standards that
would educate, would be reviewed expeditiously by, and would be acceptable
to, CPSC staff; would satisfy the legislative commands; and would accom-
modate the political and policy preferences of the Commissioners.
5 16
The young agency, hampered by all of the difficulties that invariably
accompany the creation and nascent operation of a new governmental unit-
such as implementing its organic statute517 -admirably attempted to institute
the offeror scheme but understandably proceeded by trial and error and
made numerous initial mistakes. The CPSC decided to develop mandatory
consumer product safety standards for several products as to which com-
pulsory requirements were marginally necessary because the products posed
insignificant risk, were amenable to treatment through voluntary controls,
or were not within Commission jurisdiction. Correspondingly, the CPSC
chose to develop mandatory standards for other products fhat were com-
plicated or presented hazards which were difficult to remedy with compul-
sory requirements.
The agency also instituted ineffective procedures for selecting offerors
and chose entities that lacked adequate resources, expertise or detachment,
especially from regulated interests. Moreover, the CPSC paid only out-of-
pocket expenses to individual members of the public and rarely supplied
them with independent technical assistance. Furthermore, the agency af-
forded deficient guidance throughout standard development processes.
At the outset, for example, the Commission failed to circumscribe
standard development by limiting the number of hazards to be addressed
or by setting priorities among them and required offerors to treat risks that
were unsolvable or as to which there was little documentable evidence of
injury. 1 8 After work commenced, for instance, agency staff were not
involved actively and even had adversary relationships with offerors; refused
to provide necessary data in the possession of the CPSC or to secure such
information from industry; and failed to answer questions or to facilitate
communications with the Commissioners respecting their expectations.
515. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 64, 95 (relating to time frames). Typical onerous
requirements were that standards be performance-oriented "whenever feasible" and be sup-
ported by substantial evidence and that opportunities be provided for extensive extra-Com-
mission involvement.
516. See infra note 523 and accompanying text.
517. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 76 ("A new agency like the CPSC has to establish
itself, set its priorities, test its statute, and experiment with its enforcement tools").
518. CPSC also failed to assess the risks to be treated, promising solutions to the risks
or the potential for voluntary compliance.
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Many of these problems subsequently plagued the CPSC, which con-
sumed twice as much time reviewing and revising offeror submissions as
had been required to prepare them and severely criticized the materials
tendered. The CPSC as well felt compelled to contract for expensive new
studies and testing, to substitute Commission judgment for the offeror on
appropriate levels of safety, essentially to replicate the proposed standard
development process, and to revise significantly the proposed recommen-
dations of offerors. In fairness, a substantial number of the offeror pro-
ceedings commenced within the same five-month period, so that the CPSC
"did not learn of its mistakes in one project in time to avoid them in
another.'"519
Additional individuals and entities involved in the offeror process also
were responsible for the way in which it functioned. Manufacturing repre-
sentatives initiated some proceedings principally for reasons of commercial
advantage and then pursued those economic interests throughout the stand-
ard development processes. In other offeror initiatives, representatives of
producers could have influenced unduly certain offerors; did oppose vig-
orously the imposition of requirements; dominated the proposed standard
development effort; and fought among themselves, and with all the other
participants, especially over the competitive implications of particular so-
lutions. Offerors may have lacked the requisite resources or expertise to
accomplish their difficult missions; might have managed improperly standard
development; and could have selected incorrectly, and supported inade-
quately, citizen participants. Moreover, offerors may have been unable to
generate original, or other important, data or to secure much information
from industry or the agency; did disregard CPSC instructions; tendered
packages which were unresponsive, incomplete, or disorganized; or proposed
controls that were deficient in several ways. 520 A number of these difficulties
delayed offeror drafting of proposed standards and agency promulgation
of regulations, necessitating much additional CPSC work, substantial revi-
sion of offeror submissions and even replication of proposed standard
development. Individual citizens exhibited certain inadequacies of offerors
and some weaknesses of their own but were most deficient in technical
areas.
521
Thus, the Commission's experience with the offeror process is replete
with contradictions. The offeror procedure was ineffective in part because
it failed to satisfy a number of the same conditions that underlie the
successful application of newer decisional processes.25  Moreover, the defects
519. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 94.
520. The proposals submitted resembled voluntary controls already rejected, were unfin-
ished, were inadequately supported or were too general, ambitious or design-oriented, or would
have favored specific commercial concerns or provided insufficient injury protection.
521. Some lacked negotiating skills and a few even were recalcitrant.
522. CPSC often did precisely the opposite of what the conditions indicated, but occa-




of the offeror mechanism appeared so intrinsic and so intractable-while
entities responsible for the procedure apparently did so little to remedy, and
even exacerbated, those inherent problems as well as created so many
additional difficulties-that the process could not be made to work well.
b. Implications of the Offeror Process for Government Sponsored Public
Participation
The considerations in the sentence immediately above illustrate that the
offeror process itself may have had important deleterious ramifications for
the perceived efficacy and quality of compensated citizen involvement in it,
consequences which funded individuals and entities effectively were powerless
to control. Indeed, such public participation may have been compromised or
even overshadowed. For instance, Congress characterized the CPSA's imposi-
tion on the agency of "conflicting responsibilities"-first, to weigh heavily
the offeror judgments reflected in proposals submitted, and second, to insure
the adequacy of standards promulgated-as a "serious flaw" and "one of
the principal impediments to the Commission's standard setting efforts." '523
Those statutory mandates significantly undermined any potential impact that
citizen input might have had because the CPSC discharged the second obliga-
tion by substantially modifying offeror recommendations, substituting agency
judgment and disregarding nonindustry contributions. Accordingly, reimbursed
public involvement appeared less efficacious than it actually could have been
for reasons beyond the control of those compensated.2
In short, there are numerous explanations why the offeror process worked
badly, for which all involved with the procedure have certain responsibilities.
Moreover, that process had important detrimental implications for funded
participation's perceived effectiveness and quality which reimbursed parties
essentially had little power to affect. Most importantly, however, experience
with the offeror procedure and compensated involvement in the offeror pro-
ceedings provides valuable perspectives on future experimentation.
3. Lessons
CPSC's experience with the offeror process, therefore, yields a number
of instructive and unanticipated insights. Most significantly, experimentation
at the Commission illustrates that nonregulated individuals and entities can
have salutary effects on decisionmaking and that consensual decisional
processes have considerable promise as applied in the administrative agency
context. The experiment also offers helpful suggestions about situations in
which it is most likely that nonindustry interests will enhance decisional
523. See House Offeror Report, supra note 33, at 7-8.
524, See id. at 6-88. Of course, the activity could have appeared less efficacious for other
reasons attributable to the offeror process or to exogenous factors, like pressure from Congress.
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processes and that deployment of consensual mechanisms will be successful.
Decisional processes most probably will be improved when those responsible
for decisions are very receptive to, and have considerable need for, non-
commercial input and the individuals and entities contributing that input
have substantial ability to fulfill such decisionmaker need. However, com-
pensation adequate to allow meaningful public participation must be sup-
plied, while decisionmaking may be influenced by factors extrinsic to the
citizen involvement funded, such as Congressional intervention, or even by
the decisional technique itself. Correspondingly, consensual decisional proc-
esses are most likely to function effectively when certain conditions are
satisfied, as examined below.
5 25
Implementation of the offeror procedure principally by the Commission
and secondarily by offerors confirms most of these propositions. With
respect to reimbursed non-regulated participation, the CPSC and offerors
failed to tailor the needs of decisionmakers to the abilities of those reim-
bursed. When technical skill was required, offerors which lacked the requisite
expertise or user consumers were chosen, and when conciliators were indi-
cated, recalcitrant individuals were chosen. When the needs of decision-
makers were matched more precisely with the capabilities of those involved
in the offeror proceedings, funding sufficient to permit effective participa-
tion was not always provided. Compensation also was paid in circumstances
in which public input was not needed or was unlikely to be considered or
there was little prospect of affecting decisional processes. 526 Accordingly,
Commission experimentation teaches that program administration is impor-
tant to the success of reimbursed citizen involvement.
Concomitantly, the experience at the CPSC testifies to the essential
workability of consensual decisional processes when applied in the admin-
istrative sphere while affording instructive insights, albeit by negative im-
plication, on suitable conditions for the employment of consensual
mechanisms. The Commission used the offeror procedure in a number of
contexts when its application was inadvisable or perhaps unwarranted. For
example, the agency employed the offeror process when no regulation, much
less mandatory control, was necessary or could be imposed feasibly or
invoked the offeror procedure when petitioned to do so by certain segments
of a particular industry that desired regulation for reasons of competitive
advantage, not safety. Even in circumstances which appeared more condu-
cive to the application of consensual decisional processes, however, the
offeror procedure was structured less carefully than it might have been. For
instance, the number of participants was too large to permit meaningful
525. See infra notes 538-41 and accompanying text.
526. See supra text accompanying note 523 (identifying "fundamental flaw"). The "fun-
damental flaw" Congress identified meant that there was little prospect of affecting CPSC
decisionmaking. Deficiencies in CPSC administration of funding in the offeror process were
quite similar to those evidenced in experimentation with funding outside the offeror process.
See Tobias, supra note 2, at § III.A.4.
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exchange or the Commission refused to provide guidance when the need
for it was imperative. Thus, CPSC experimentation illustrates that consen-
sual decisional processes should be employed selectively and once chosen,
structured with careful attention to certain details if consensual techniques
are to be applied successfully. 27 The offeror procedure also was costly,
even though subsequent experimentation with its successors seems inexpen-
sive, especially in contrast to other mechanisms for developing standards,
for acquiring decisionmaking input, and for resolving disputes.',
The Commission's experience instructs as well that a newly-created unit
of government, plagued by all of the complications inherent in becoming
established, is not the best governmental entity to experiment with a unique
procedure for developing standards or with a nascent technique for pro-
moting public involvement in that process like participant compensation.
Therefore, the CPSC probably was an inauspicious choice both for testing
the offeror mechanism and the reimbursement concept. However, if another
substantial participant funding effort-that conducted by the Federal Trade
Commission-could be described similarly,129 while the offeror process could
be made to work only in a small number of situations and even then at
considerable cost, perhaps both participant reimbursement and the offeror
procedure were deficient in certain respects. These considerations and nu-
merous factors examined already suggest that Congressional abolition of
the offeror mechanism may have been indicated. Thus, in light of the
problems encountered in making the process function effectively, the expense
incident to doing so, and determinations respecting allocation of limited
resources, the legislative action appears reasonable. 30
B. General Conclusions
Compensated noncommercial involvement in Commission offeror initi-
atives was valuable enough to justify revitalization of the reimbursement
527. See infra notes 538-41 and accompanying text (number of conditions that may be
important to success).
528. See supra note 513 (relating to the offeror mechanism); ACUS Recommendation 86-
3, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,641, 25,643 (1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1987)) (preamble).
Harter, supra note 176, at 56 (relating to the apparently inexpensive nature of its successors);
cf. ACUS Recommendation 85-5, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52,895 (1985) (codified at 1 C.F.R. §
305.85-5 (1987)) (preamble) (ACUS belief that, although aspects of negotiated rulemakings
may entail some short-term additional costs, those costs are more than offset by potential
long-range savings); Susskind & McMahon, supra note 1, at 152, 163 (EPA "negotiated
rulemaking appeared to produce more legitimate outcomes at a lower cost than usual" but
"too few data available to calculate formally the cost-effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking").
529. Boyer, Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: The Federal Trade
Commission Experience, 70 GEO. L. J. 51, 140 (1981) ("The FTC of the 1970's, in many
respects, was a particularly unfortunate time and place to experiment with direct funding for
public participation").
530. Much that offeror experimentation teaches is not novel or unanticipated but even
this is valuable insofar as it reaffirms what had been reported before. See infra note 540 and
accompanying text (relating to the offeror process, for example, agency involvement must be
planned carefully); Tobias, supra note 2, at note 368 (relating to participant funding).
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concept and ongoing work in appropriate circumstances at the CPSC and
at additional units of government. Funded participation actually was quite
beneficial, considering all of the limitations imposed, particularly by the
offeror process. Similarly, that novel procedure operated rather respectably,
in light of the formidable obstacles to success, thereby testifying to the
inherent workability and considerable promise of consensual decisional
processes, even in their earliest, least refined conceptualizations. Therefore,
it is unnecessary to ascertain whether the offeror process should be reinsti-
tuted because continuing experimentation with successors such as regulatory
negotiation ought to suffice.
IV. SUGGESTIONs FOR FuTuaR EXPERIMENTATION
Participant reimbursement is one condition that will be important to
the successful application of consensual decisional processes in certain
contexts. 3 ' I have offered already numerous prescriptions for experimen-
tation with compensation. 5 2 Accordingly, the recommendation summarizing
the suggestions made only needs to be stated here: "Participant funding
should be revived and rigorously evaluated, other mechanisms for rectifying
the imbalance in input and improving decisionmaking should be explored
and analyzed, and the cost and efficacy of these alternatives should be
compared."
5 33
Vigorous experimentation with successors of the offeror process should
continue and ought to be assessed closely, alternative techniques for en-
hancing decisionmaking and for resolving disputes should be explored and
evaluated, and the expense and effectiveness of the mechanism ought to be
contrasted. Experimentation, which emphasizes diversity and flexibility,
should proceed selectively at the Commission and at additional governmental
entities in circumstances in which consensual procedures have functioned
well, appeared to have potential or have not been tried.
5 34
531. For example, in regulatory negotiations, individual citizens or "public interest group"
representatives that participate probably will require resource support so that they can be
effective. See Harter, supra note 176, at 55-57; Susskind & McMahon, supra note 1, at 160-
61. Indeed, ACUS twice has recognized the need for such support and recommended that
provision be made for it. See ACUS Recommendation 85-5, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52,896
(1985) (codified at I C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1987)) (paragraph 9); ACUS Recommendation 82-4,
47 Fed. Reg. 30,708, 30,710 (1982) (codified at I C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1987)) (paragraph 9).
532. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § IV.; cf. Tobias, supra note 3, at § IV. (earlier
prescriptions).
533. Tobias, supra note 2, at text accompanying note 380. See supra note 531 (ACUS
twice recognized need for resource support for public participation in negotiated rulemakings
and recommended that provisions be made for such support).
534. For instance, work with regulatory negotiation should continue at the Environmental
Protection Agency, because the agency has experimented successfully with the mechanism and
its experience can save expense, such as start-up costs. See Perritt, supra note 1, at 1674-82;
Susskind & McMahon, supra note 1; see also supra note 1 (compilations of agencies that have
negotiated rulemakings completed, ongoing or contemplated and of mechanisms available in
federal administrative agency context).
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The experimentation ought to be planned carefully. Agencies should
study consensual mechanisms and attempt to designate situations in which
their use would be most effective, although this exercise necessarily will
require case-by-case consideration of the constellation of variables present
in specific instances . 35 Many units of government currently possess sufficient
authority and have adequate resources to initiate most types of experimen-
tation.53 6 Nevertheless, agencies contemplating application of consesual de-
cisional techniques may want to assess their circumstances and if deficiencies
are discovered the governmental entities should request the necessary au-
thorization and appropriations from Congress.5 7 Agencies should implement
efforts that maximize the potential for flexible experimentation, are admin-
istered carefully and capitalize on experience at the Commission with the
offeror process, albeit by negative inference, or at other agencies with
similar devices.
Previous experience with consensual decisional processes, especially reg-
ulatory negotiation, indicates that their employment is more likely to be
successful when certain conditions are satisfied although situation-specific
analysis will be necessary. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify many
conditions that will apply in most instances. The number of affected interests
participating ought to be circumscribed, none should possess so much power
that it can control the outcome, and all interests should be committed to
the process, believing that they stand to benefit. 38 The issues in dispute
535. Of course, this complicates planning. See infra notes 538-41 and accompanying text
(numerous relevant variables); see also ACUS Recommendation 86-3, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,641,
25,643 (1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1987)) (preamble); ACUS Recommendation
85-5, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52,895 (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1987) (preamble) (discussions
of need for, and difficulties entailed in, case-by-case consideration).
536. See Harter, supra note 176, at 12, 22, 107-09, 112-13 (helpful background discussion
of agency power to conduct negotiated rulemakings); Susskind & McMahon, supra note 1, at
157-59 (same); cf. Perritt, supra note 1, at 1629 (finding extant agency authority sufficient to
conduct negotiated rulemakings); ACUS Recommendation 86-3, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,641, 25,643-
45 (1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1987) (recognizing extant agency authority sufficient
to initiate experimentation with certain other types of ADR); Tobias, supra note 3, at § III.A.
(sufficient implied agency authority to fund public participants).
537. Congress should be receptive to such requests given the successful, cost effective
nature of experimentation to date. Comprehensive legislation has not been enacted, although
ACUS has recommended that Congress "facilitate the regulatory negotiation process by passing
legislation." ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,708, 30,709 (1982) (codified at 1
C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1987)) (paragraph 2). See Perritt, supra note 1, at 1629 (cautioning against
Congressional amendment of the Administrative Procedure Act because of potential flexibility
loss and of Federal Advisory Committee Act because unnecessary although recommending that
General Services Administration amend regulations to clarify uncertainty regarding advisory
committees and ADR); see also ACUS Recommendation 86-3, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,641, 25,643-45
(1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1987)) (recognizing necessity for Congress to authorize
experimentation with certain types of ADR and so recommending).
538. See ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,708, 30,709 (1982) (codified at 1
C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1987)) (paragraphs 4(c), (e) and (f)); Harter, supra note 176, at 45-49, 51-
52; Perritt, supra note 1, at 1643-44. Susskind and McMahon agree with the last proposition
in the text. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 1, at 157. But they disagree with the first
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ought to be "ripe for decision" and should be sufficiently numerous and
different to allow trading, while disposition of the questions should not be
governed by basic research and resolution of the issues cannot demand
compromise by participants on core principles.s39 Those involved should
anticipate that a decision will be imposed externally, if they do not agree,
and participants ought to have a "reasonable expectation" that the agency
will be involved and receptive to the accommodation reached.Y4 These
conditions also may have important components, such as provision of
funding for nonregulated interests that participate. Finally, it is important
to recognize that the requirements enumerated may vary, and that other
conditions may apply, in any given context.
41
two propositions. See id. at 153-56. 1 rely most substantially here and in the remainder of this
paragraph on Harter and Perritt, supra and on ACUS Recommendations 82-4 and 85-5
premised respectively on Harter and Perritt, but Susskind and McMahon are very helpful. Of
course, much said about the offeror process in this article also applies. For example, the
infighting among manufacturers in an industry observed in several offeror proceedings prefi-
gures Professor Perritt's statement that the "most difficult challenge to a negotiated agreement
involves not the process at the negotiating table but the process of resolving intraconstituency
disagreements away from the table." Perritt, supra at 1715; cf. ACUS Recommendation 85-
5, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52,895 (1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1987)) (paragraph 7)
(recognizing need to "address internal disagreements within a particular constituency").
539. See ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,708, 30,709 (1982) (codified at 1
C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1987)) (paragraphs 4(a), (b) and (d)); Harter, supra note 176, at 47-52,
Perritt, supra note 1, at 1643-44. Susskind & McMahon essentially agree with the last three
propositions. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 1, at 152, 160-61. But they disagree with
the first proposition. See id. at 156-57.
540. See ACUS Recommendation 85-5, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52,895 (1985) (codified at I
C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1987)) (paragraphs I and 2); ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 47 Fed. Reg.
30,708, 30,709-10 (1982) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1987)) (paragraphs 4(a), 4(g) and
8); Harter, supra note 176, at 47-48, 51-52, 57-67; Perritt, supra note I, at 1711-13. Susskind
& McMahon agree with the second proposition. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note I, at
157-63. But they found participant willingness to negotiate energetically and in good faith as
significant as deadlines. See id. at 157. See also Perritt, supra at 1629 ("most important
insight" gleaned from analyzing completed negotiated rulemakings was that agency sponsoring
negotiations should participate).
541. The conditions enumerated in the paragraph in the text are drawn principally from
experience with negotiated rulemakings. The evaluator of four completed negotiated rulemak-
ings has offered the following cogent admonitions:
It is important to view both the 1982 and the 1985 [negotiated rulemaking]
recommendations of the ACUS as a guide to issues to be considered rather than a
formula to be followed. Negotiation is intrinsically a process that cannot be specified
entirely in advance. Accordingly, what will 'work' in a particular case depends on
the number of factors: substantive issues, perception of the agency's position by
affected parties, relationships among the parties, authority of party representatives
in the negotiations, negotiating style of the representatives, divergence of views within
each constituency represented, and skill of agency personnel and mediators. Some
of these variables almost certainly will change several times during the negotiations.
An agency cannot expect that the pattern followed successfully by another agency,
or even by itself on another issue, can be transplanted without modification to
another negotiation.
Perritt, supra note 1, at 1629 (citation omitted); accord, ACUS Recommendation 85-5, 50
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Congress could institute the recommendations above. It can analyze
prior experimentation with consensual techniques, delineate appropriate
circumstances for future work in substantive statutes and make available
sufficient money for experimentation through appropriations measures.
Should Congress decide not to enact authorizing legislation, agencies cur-
rently possess the requisite power to continue experimenting selectively with
consensual decisional procedures. 542
The experimentation that is conducted ought to be assessed "rigorously"
by an expert evaluator who is not affiliated with the agency.543 An attempt
then should be undertaken to reach more definitive judgments than before
regarding the effectiveness of consensual decisional processes and the optimal
conditions for their application. Finally, the efficacy and cost of these
mechanisms should be contrasted with other measures employed to improve
decisionmaking and resolve disputes.
CONCLUSION
Consumer Product Safety Commission experimentation with the offeror
process and with funded nonindustry participation in that procedure is very
informative. Compensated citizen involvement was sufficiently worthwhile
to support additional experimentation in appropriately tailored contexts.
The offeror process did not work particularly well. The experience of the
CPSC, however, does afford numerous valuable insights for successful,
future experimentation with the successors of the offeror procedure which
appears to be promising mechanisms for enhancing decisional processes and
for facilitating dispute resolution in the modern administrative state.
Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52,895 (1985) (codified at I C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1987)) (preamble). Of course,
these admonitions apply equally to experimentation with other consensual decisional processes
as well as to decisions to employ particular procedures in specific contexts. See ACUS
Recommendation 86-3, 51 ]Fed. Reg. 25,641, 25,643 (1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3
(1987)) (preamble). For comprehensive catalogs of conditions and their components as well as
helpful guidance for agency implementation of consensual processes, see ACUS Recommen-
dation 86-3, supra, at 25,643-45; ACUS Recommendation 85-5, supra, at 52,895-96; ACUS
Recommendation 82-4, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,708, 30,708-10 (codified at I C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1987));
Perritt, supra, at 1708-17; Harter, supra note 176.
542. See supra notes 536-537 (discussions of agency power and advisability of Congres-
sional implementation). Courts should not invalidate such exercise of authority unless it clearly
is in excess of agency statutory power. See also ACUS Recommendation 86-3, 51 Fed. Reg.
25,641, 25,643 (1986) (codified at I C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1987)) (Congress and courts should
not inhibit agency uses of ADR by requiring formality where inappropriate).
543. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 1, at 140-42 (helpful discussion of evaluation);
Harter & Eads, Policy Instruments, Institutions and Objectives: An Analytical Framework for
Assessing "Alternatives" to Regulation, 37 ADMTN. L. Ry. 221 (1985) (broader, theoretical
discussion of techniques); see also ACUS Recommendation 86-3, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,641, 25,643
(1986) (codified at I C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1987)) (preamble) (recognizing increasing use of ADR
and recommending supplementation with further empirical research).
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